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What’s the Beef? The FDA, USDA,
and Cell-Cultured Meat
Tammi S. Etheridge*
Abstract
Over the past ten years, administrative law scholarship has
increasingly focused on interactions between multiple agencies.
As part of this trend, most scholars have called for policymakers
to combine multiple agencies, rather than rely on a single agency,
to solve policy problems. The literature in this area espouses the
benefits of shared regulatory space. But very little of this
scholarship addresses when shared jurisdiction is problematic.
This is particularly concerning when an agency opts into or cedes
oversight authority to another agency at will, with little regard
for whether the second agency is an appropriate regulator. The
case of cell-cultured (or lab-grown) meat presents one such
example. In 2018, both the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture separately announced
that regulating cell-cultured meat fell under their sole purview,
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to the exclusion of the other agency. After much back-and-forth,
the agencies issued a joint statement announcing a shared
system of regulatory oversight.
This Article argues that the FDA should not have ceded any
of its regulatory authority to the USDA because joint regulation
of cell-cultured meat, as between the FDA and USDA, is both
inappropriate and unnecessary. USDA involvement is
inappropriate because the Department suffers from a mixed
mandate problem. Not only is the Department tasked with
maximizing agricultural industry profits (and minimizing
losses), but it is also tasked with nourishing Americans (and
improving nutrition and health). In the case of cell-cultured
meat, these two goals are diametrically opposed. Further, USDA
involvement is inappropriate given the Department’s purview, as
set by Congress, and its concomitant expertise. As it relates to
meat, the USDA exists specifically to monitor the safety and
sanitation of the nation’s farms, slaughterhouses, and meat
processing and packaging plants. Consequently, all the
Department’s meat-related regulations and expertise are in these
areas. USDA involvement in the regulation of cell-cultured meat
is also unnecessary because it is redundant. Accordingly, this
Article’s analysis belies the notion that all agency collaboration
is good collaboration.
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 1731
I.

A CELL-CULTURED MEAT PRIMER ........................ 1736
A. Cell-Cultured Meat and Conventional
Meat ................................................................ 1737
B. Health and Safety Concerns ........................... 1740
C. The Benefits of Cell-Cultured Meat................ 1742
1. Environmental Benefits ............................ 1742
2. Social Benefits ........................................... 1746
3. Animal Welfare ......................................... 1747
4. Economic Benefits ..................................... 1748

II.

THE RACE TO REGULATE CELL-CULTURED MEAT 1750

III.

THE USDA’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGULATION
OF CELL-CULTURED MEAT IS INAPPROPRIATE ..... 1756

WHAT’S THE BEEF?

1731

A. USDA Mandates and Concomitant
Problems ......................................................... 1758
1. The Multiple Mandate Problem ............... 1758
2. The USDA’s Congressional Mandate ....... 1759
3. The Department’s Mixed Mandate........... 1763
4. Agency Capture ......................................... 1769
B. The Origins of the USDA’s Jurisdiction and
Its Expertise .................................................... 1776
C. The Federal Meat Inspection Act ..................... 1780
D. Horizontal Coherence ....................................... 1782
IV.

ADEQUACY OF FDA CONTROL ............................... 1785
A. Regulation of Establishments .......................... 1787
B. Labeling ............................................................ 1790

V.

LEGAL STRATEGIES ................................................ 1794

CONCLUSION .................................................................... 1800

INTRODUCTION
The cellular agriculture industry, with cell-cultured meat
at the forefront, is poised to become a significant industry
disruptor. The cell-cultured meat market alone is projected to
reach $140 billion over the next ten years.1 While there were
just a handful of cell-cultured meat start-ups in 2016, there are
at least sixty today.2 This past year, the market’s
potentialcombined with the industry’s commitment to
“humane
and
environmentally
sustainable”
protein
sources“has attracted record venture capital funding.”3
Moreover, countries around the world have begun to approve the
sale of cell-cultured meat products. Singapore became the first
in December 2020 when it approved Eat Just Inc.’s sale of
1. See Meating Demand—The Lean, Green, Money‑Making Machine,
EDISON (Oct. 2020), https://perma.cc/EY6N-VWXA. (“Longer-term growth
projections vary greatly, with revenue estimates for the global market in 2030
ranging from $140bn (Barclays) to $252bn (Kearney).”).
2. Agnieszka de Sousa, Lab-Grown Meat Is Getting Closer to
Supermarket Shelves, BLOOMBERG GREEN (Dec. 9, 2020, 7:09 PM),
https://perma.cc/9KMK-W255 (last updated Dec. 10, 2020, 11:49 AM).
3. Id.
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cell-cultured chicken.4 And several start-up companies are
promising to bring cell-cultured meat to market as early as
2022.5
Despite all of its potential, both economic and otherwise, the
United States has yet to approve the sale of cell-cultured meat.
In fact, the U.S. government only recently determined which
federal agencies would oversee the production and sale of these
products, after many months of back and forth.6 The current
plan calls for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
oversee cell collection, cell banks, and tissue maturation.7
Oversight will then shift to the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) for processing, packaging, and labeling.8 In essence, the
FDA will oversee all processing prior to the existence of a
matured tissue product, and the USDA will then oversee all
subsequent processes.9 The agencies have yet to allocate
oversight responsibility for the product once it leaves the lab.10
Beyond these practical considerations, there are broader
questions to raise about the need for and appropriateness of
shared jurisdiction in this instance.
This Article makes the normative claim that, in the case of
cell-cultured meat, the FDA should not have ceded any of its
regulatory authority to the USDA because joint regulation of
cell-cultured meat, as between the FDA and USDA, is both
inappropriate and unnecessary. USDA involvement is
inappropriate, on one hand, because the Department suffers
from a mixed mandate problem. Not only is the Department
4. Id.
5. See id. (introducing start-ups like Memphis Meats (now Upside
Foods), BlueNalu, and Aleph Farms).
6. See News Release, FDA, USDA and FDA Announce a Formal
Agreement to Regulate Cell-Cultured Food Products from Cell Lines of
Livestock and Poultry (Mar. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/V3AF-CDTN.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. (“This shared regulatory approach will ensure that
cell-cultured products derived from the cell lines of livestock and poultry are
produced safely and are accurately labeled.”).
10. See id. (“FSIS and FDA released a formal agreement to address the
regulatory oversight of human food produced using this new technology. The
formal agreement describes the oversight roles and responsibilities for both
agencies and how the agencies will collaborate to regulate the development
and entry of these products into commerce.”).

WHAT’S THE BEEF?

1733

tasked with maximizing agricultural industry profits (and
minimizing losses), but it is also tasked with nourishing
Americans (and improving nutrition and health).11 In the case
of cell-cultured meat, these two goals are diametrically opposed.
Given the Department’s long history of capture, we can expect
that it will favor industry when forced to choose between the
two.12 On the other hand, USDA involvement is inappropriate
given the Department’s purview, as set by Congress, and its
concomitant expertise.13 As it relates to meat, the USDA exists
specifically to monitor the safety and sanitation of the nation’s
farms, slaughterhouses, and meat processing and packaging
plants.14 Consequently, all the Department’s meat-related
regulations and expertise are in these areas. Yet, the
cell-culturing process has very little in common with the
traditional raising, slaughtering, and processing of meat from
the carcass of an animal.15 Cell-culturing in a lab actually has
more in common with the development of drugs than with
traditional meat processing processes.16 Related to the questions
of mandates and expertise is the question of whether the USDA

11. See Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101–624, pmbl., 104 Stat. 3359, 3359 (authorizing the USDA to “extend
and revise agricultural price support and related programs”); About the U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
USDA,
https://perma.cc/3CJA-GUNU
(highlighting that the USDA’s vision of “promot[ing] agriculture production
that better nourishes Americans”).
12. See infra Part III.A.4.
13. See infra Part III.A.4.
14. See Summary of Federal Inspection Requirements for Meat Products,
USDA, https://perma.cc/4ZK6-MPYZ (PDF) (last updated Sept. 2015) (“The
Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) requires that all meat sold commercially
be inspected and passed to ensure that it is safe, wholesome, and properly
labeled. The USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is responsible
for providing this inspection.”).
15. See
What
Is
Cultured
Meat,
MAASTRICHT
UNIV.,
https://perma.cc/YP85-QH5E (detailing how scientists create cell-cultured beef
“by painlessly harvesting muscle cells from a living cow” and “feed[ing] and
nurtur[ing] the cells so they multiply to create muscle tissue”).
16. Compare id. (explaining cell cultures’ role in developing meat), with
Karol Jaroch et al., Cell Cultures in Drug Discovery and Development: The
Need of Reliable In Vitro-In Vivo Extrapolation for Pharmacodynamics and
Pharmacokinetics Assessment, 147 J. PHARM. & BIOMEDICAL ANALYSIS 297, 297
(2018) (“[C]ell cultures have been a part of drug development for many years.”).
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lawfully has jurisdiction over cell-cultured meat.17 According to
the definitions in the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA),18
cell-cultured meat is not a meat product.19 This view coincides
completely with the various approaches to the product
elsewhere under the law.
USDA involvement in the regulation of cell-cultured meat
is also unnecessary because it is redundant. In the proposed
regulatory scheme, the USDA will solely be responsible for (1)
overseeing establishments that conduct cell harvesting from
livestock or poultry; (2) using appropriate USDA marks of
inspection to confirm that oversight; (3) overseeing product
testing and review to ensure that products are unadulterated
and, again, properly labeled as such; and (4) managing all
pre-approval and verification processes.20 The proposed scheme
also authorizes the USDA to develop additional requirements as
necessary and to conduct necessary enforcements to ensure that
misbranded, mislabeled, and adulterated products do not enter
the market or, if they do, that they are quickly removed when
identified.21 Yet, the FDA is already responsible for all of these
same tasks and in areas far more akin to cell-culturing. For
example, the FDA routinely inspects certain types of
establishments including vaccine and drug manufacturers
(which use culturing), blood banks (which use culturing), and
food processing facilitieswhich, apparently, now use
culturing.22 Moreover, the FDA has a long-established
pre-approval process that is activated once a company applies to

17. See JOEL L. GREENE & SAHAR ANGADJIVAND, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
IF10947, REGULATION OF CELL-CULTURED MEAT 1–2 (2018) (“Some argue that
cell-cultured meat will be produced in facilities that are similar to food
manufacturing or biologics facilities that FDA currently regulates, whereas
cell-cultured production will not look like slaughter plants that FSIS
regulates.”).
18. Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34
Stat. 669 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–695).
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 601 (lacking any reference to cell-cultured meat).
20. Formal Agreement Between FDA and USDA Regarding Oversight of
Human Food Produced Using Animal Cell Technology Derived from Cell Lines
of USDA-Amenable Species, FDA (Mar. 7, 2019) [hereinafter Formal
Agreement Between FDA and USDA], https://perma.cc/VB45-86V5.
21. Id.
22. See What Does FDA Inspect?, FDA (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://perma.cc/J5RP-9WNT.
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market a new product.23 Finally, the FDA can implement a
“for-cause” inspection to investigate any problems that are
brought to the agency’s attention, including issues of
misbranding, mislabeling, and adulteration.24 These existing
regulations are sufficient to oversee the safe processing,
packaging, and labeling of cell-cultured meat.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I serves as a brief
primer on cell-cultured meat, presenting the science behind the
product, sharing some of the health and safety concerns, and
addressing the benefits associated with its use and the potential
business ramifications. Part II of the Article describes the
interplay between the FDA and USDA in the race to regulate
cell-cultured meat. Part III of the Article argues that USDA
involvement in the regulation of cell-cultured meat is
inappropriate because of (1) the problems associated with the
Department’s mixed mandate; (2) the agency’s jurisdiction and
expertise; (3) the definition of meat product under the Federal
Meat Inspection Act; and (4) the need for horizontal coherence
in the law. Part IV of the Article argues that the FDA had very
little incentive to cede any of its regulatory authority to the
USDA—namely because the FDA is more than capable of seeing
cell-cultured meat safely to market, as it does with most other
processed foods and drugs, without USDA involvement and the
associated risks. Part V of the Article considers and dispenses
with various legal strategies that might be employed to remedy
the problem. The Article concludes with a few remarks on how
best to disentangle this problematic relationship.
While on its face this issue may seem minor, there are in
fact broader implications for how society views the regulation of
emerging technology. As innovation and technology continue to
advance at a rapid clip, Congress will have to either
continuously expand the mandates of the existing federal
agencies or be willing to continually create new agencies. As
another, seemingly more practical approach, federal agencies
may begin partnering up more frequently to address
complicated new products. To the extent that these partnerships
will become more ubiquitous, Congress should create systems to
23. See AGATA DABROWSKA & SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41983,
HOW FDA APPROVES DRUGS AND REGULATES THEIR SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS
1 (2018).
24. See What Does FDA Inspect?, supra note 22.
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ensure that they are both necessary and appropriate. Federal
agencies should not have unfettered ability to negotiate or
barter for authority amongst themselves without any formal
oversight or checks on this power. As it stands, the story of
cell-cultured meat sets a chilling precedent such that one agency
(the FDA) can opt into oversight based on its mandate or cede
that authority to another agency (the USDA), with little regard
for whether the second agency is an appropriate regulator. Case
studies of this sort are arising more frequently given the volume
of new technology and the frequency of overlapping mandates.
I.

A CELL-CULTURED MEAT PRIMER

To understand the kerfuffle around the regulation of
cell-cultured meat, one must first understand a few things about
the product. Cellular agriculture describes the process whereby
conventional animal products are made for consumption
without the involvement of those animals.25 Due, in part, to the
presence of a manufacturing process and small distinctions
between conventional meat (or traditional meat) and the
product resulting from that manufacturing process, there has
been a great deal of debate about whether cell-cultured meat can
be accurately described as meat and whether it is truly safe for
consumption.26 For some people, the distinction between
conventional meat and cell-cultured meat is of very little
importance.27 These people are more concerned with the benefits
that will inure to people, animals, and the environment as
humanity moves away from the consumption of domesticated
25. See Natalie R. Rubio et al., Plant-Based and Cell-Based Approaches
to Meat Production, NATURE COMMC’NS (2020), https://perma.cc/CTS5-WH65
(PDF) (“[L]ab-grown meat or cultured meat is meat produced by cultivating
cells as opposed to farming animals.”).
26. See Sghaier Chriki & Jean-François Hocquette, The Myth of Cultured
Meat: A Review, 7 FRONTIERS NUTRITION, Feb. 7 2020, at 1, 6,
https://perma.cc/2UKT-SYFQ (PDF) (explaining that advocates of
cell-cultured beef are concerned with some consumers’ perception that
cell-cultured meat is “fake”); Rose Eveleth, Is Lab-Grown Meat Really Meat?,
FUTURE TENSE (July 11, 2018, 8:32 AM), https://perma.cc/7VM5-KDMX
(recounting a naming controversy between cultured meat companies and a
meat industry organization).
27. See Chriki & Hocquette, supra note 26, at 5 (stating that acceptance
of cultured meat will differ based on differences in culture, gender, and
information access).
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animals (and their many by-products) towards cellular
agriculture.28 Others are principally concerned with the health
and safety implications of these novel manufacturing
processes.29 Finally, there are those who are most concerned
with the economic implications resulting from the growth of the
cellular agriculture industry.30 Each of these distinct interest
groups has had a hand in the regulatory discourse.
A.

Cell-Cultured Meat and Conventional Meat

Cell-cultured meat is a food product derived from bovine
animal cell cultures (typically stem cells) that have been
harvested from a healthy animal and grown by scientists in a
lab.31 The process begins with the removal of a small sample of
muscle tissue from a live cow (a biopsy).32 The piece of muscle
tissue is then cut to liberate the stem cells.33 Once the stem cells
have been extracted, they are placed in a culture that will
provide nutrients, hormones, and growth factors.34 That culture
will also allow the stem cells to divide on their own.35
Eventually, the cells will merge and arrange themselves into
small fibers called myotubes.36 The myotubes will convert into
primitive muscle fibers before bulking up to form muscle
28. See id. at 4 (discussing survey data that suggests cultured meat is
most popular among consumers who want to be more socially responsible).
29. See id. at 5 (underscoring that “consumers will not be willing to accept
any compromises in terms of food safety”).
30. See Meating Demand, supra note 1 (“The cell-based meat industry is
still nascent, where global investments in 2018 [totaled $50 million],
equivalent to only 6% of the amount invested in plant-based food; however, as
cell-based meat becomes revenue generating there will be scope for greater
investment . . . .”).
31. While broader interpretations of the term meat include pork, poultry,
and the like, for purposes of this Article the focus is on products that have been
traditionally viewed as “beef.”
32. Mark J. Post, Cultured Beef: Medical Technology to Produce Food, 94
J. SCI. FOOD & AGRIC. 1039, 1040 (2014).
33. Id. at 1040.
34. Id.
35. Id. One of the most common mediums is Fetal Bovine Serum (FBS),
which is made from the blood of a dead calf. See Carlo E.A. Jochems et al., The
Use of Fetal Bovine Serum: Ethical or Scientific Problem?, 30 ALTS. TO LAB’Y
ANIMALS 219, 220 (2002).
36. Post, supra note 32, at 1039.
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tissue.37 To achieve a more muscle-like end product, the “meat”38
must be grown on a lattice or frame known as scaffolding.39
Throughout the process, the cells and their warm,
body-temperature environment must be closely monitored using
a bioreactor.40 Significantly, tissue-engineering in this way does
not require any genetic modification.41
In sum, cell-cultured meat is artificial muscle (or muscle
proteins) created by tissue-engineering in a lab.42 The
relationship between muscle tissue and meat is uncomplicated.
Meat comes from muscle tissue that has had the opportunity to
mature.43 For example, cow muscle tissue is very tough, and for
beef to be tender enough to eat, a consumer must wait at least a
few days after the animal was slaughtered to consume it.44
Researchers do not fully understand these naturally occurring
processes, however, and therefore they cannot truly replicate

37. This methodology was inspired by techniques in regenerative
medicine for reconstructing patients’ deteriorated muscle tissue from their
own cells. See id. at 1040.
38. This is an implicit recognition that the word meat has positive
connotations. See, e.g., Jean-François Hocquette, Is In Vitro Meat the Solution
for the Future?, 120 MEAT SCI. 167, 169 (2016) (“[F]or example, meat is a
symbol of force (inherited from the fact that primitive hunters had to be strong
to hunt wild animals) and of high nutritional value (meat provides proteins in
quantity and quality and many micro-nutrients which are beneficial for
health).”).
39. See Neil Stephens et al., Bringing Cultural Meat to Market: Technical,
Socio-Political, and Regulatory Challenges in Cellular Agriculture, 78 TRENDS
FOOD SCI. & TECH. 155, 159–60 (2018).
40. See Hocquette, supra note 38, at 170.
41. See Stephens et al., supra note 39, at 157 (stressing that cultured
meat is “genetically identical” to agriculturally produced meat).
42. See Hocquette, supra note 38, at 170 (asserting that the term
“artificial muscle proteins” is more accurate than “artificial meat”).
43. During
the
maturation
process,
“important
biochemical
transformations gradually take place as the pH of the muscle falls as a result
of the absence of oxygen following the slaughter of the animal.” Hocquette,
supra note 38, at 169. More specifically, “intramuscular glycogen is broken
down into lactic acid” which results in a decline in muscular pH, which in turn
activates in sequence a succession of enzyme families whose activity leads to
the breakdown of muscle proteins and the tenderization of meat. Id. at 170.
44. See Ahmed Ouali et al., Biomarkers of Meat Tenderness: Present
Knowledge and Perspectives in Regards to Our Current Understanding of the
Mechanisms Involved, 95 MEAT SCI. 854, 855–56 (2013).
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them in the manufacture of cell-cultured meat.45 Despite these
differences, cell-cultured meat rises to the level of “biological
equivalence,” producing “molecularly and genetically identical
material that delivers viscerally equivalent eating or usage
experiences.”46
There are various distinctions between cell-cultured meat
and conventional meat. While real muscle tissue is largely
composed of muscle cells formed by myoblasts, it also contains a
small amount of nerve, blood, and fat cells.47 These nerve, blood,
and fat cells are either absent in cell-cultured meat or present
in very low proportions.48 Likewise, where beef from a steer or a
heifer naturally includes muscle, adipose tissue, connective
tissue, cartilage, and blood vessels, cell-cultured meat is not
nearly as complex.49 Finally, there are notable differences in
visual appearance,50 taste,51 and nutritional makeup52 that
distinguish cell-cultured meat from conventional meat.
Cell-cultured meat producers must, therefore, introduce food
coloring to make the product pink, adipose cells to emulate the
well-known taste of beef, and vitamins and minerals
(particularly micronutrients, like iron) to make the product as
palatable and as healthy as conventional meat.53

45. See generally id.
46. Stephens et al., supra note 39, at 157.
47. Hocquette, supra note 38, at 170.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 169–70.
50. When cultured meat is produced, for example, the muscles fibers
appear yellow as opposed to pink or red like conventional meat. Id. at 170. This
is because cells must be cultured in ambient oxygen conditions, which
suppresses myoglobin expression. Id. Myoglobin expression provides
conventional meat with its red coloring. Id.
51. It has also been extremely difficult to reproduce the taste of
conventional meat because that taste “results from a complex interaction
between proteins, carbohydrates, and the aromas of the lipid fraction.” Id.
52. The vitamins (especially B12) and micronutrients that give
conventional meat its nutritional benefits are not naturally occurring in
cultured meat and must be added. Id.
53. See id. (explaining that to reproduce the taste of conventional meat,
“adipose cells need to be introduced” to the culturing process); Robin Simsa et
al., Extracellular Heme Proteins Influence Bovine Myosatellite Cell
Proliferation and the Color of Cell-Based Meat, 8 FOODS 521, 522 (2019)
(discussing the addition of myoglobin or hemoglobin to color cultured meat).
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B.

Health and Safety Concerns

Advocates of cell-cultured meat have argued that the
product is safer than conventional meat because it is grown in a
well-controlled laboratory environment without other
organisms to contaminate it.54 This is in direct contrast to the
living conditions of animals raised for slaughter and human
consumption. Those animals often live in confined spaces where
they risk contracting diseases, like influenza, and must be
heavily vaccinated against them.55 The proximity to other
animals also impacts the animal’s internal environment. There
is a risk of cross-contamination from digestive organs from other
animals during slaughter.56 In the absence of a significant
number of other animals, it is highly unlikely for cell-cultured
meat to encounter any diseases or intestinal pathogens
including E. coli, Salmonella, or Campylobacter.57 This is
significant because these three pathogens cause millions of
instances of illness each year.58
There are also notable concerns regarding the health and
safety of cell-cultured meat. The public has expressed some
doubts about the increasing use of food technology, including
tissue-engineering, especially as it relates to the health effects
of consumption.59 One concern is the significant number of
additives in cell-cultured meat and their concomitant impacts
on humans.60 Antibiotics and fungicides must be used
throughout the culturing process to avoid contamination of cell

54. See Chriki & Hocquette, supra note 26, at 4 (“[T]he issue of spoilage
and of pathogens are different between cultured meat and conventional
meat . . . .”).
55. See id. at 2–3.
56. See id. at 3 (“[W]ithout any digestive organs nearby . . . and therefore
without any potential contamination at slaughter, cultured muscle cells do not
have the same opportunity to encounter intestinal pathogens . . . .”).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Chriki & Hocquette, supra note 26, at 6 (“[C]onsumers may
accept . . . cultured meat, but will require a trusted process of control and
regulations to ensure complete safety of the product.”).
60. See id. at 2 (“The research questions are now: how can these
compounds be produced on an industrial scale, and how can [it] be ensured
that none of them will have negative effects on human health in the short and
long term?”).
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cultures.61 This seems to amplify the antibiotic resistance
problems already created by American livestock.62 Moreover,
the medium used to nurture cell-cultured meat must also
contain added hormones and growth factors to sustain the
required proliferation and differentiation.63 Hormone growth
promoters are already prohibited from conventional meat
farming in the European Union because of health and safety
concerns.64 Further, there is no real strategy for adding
micronutrients to cell-cultured meat, including B12 and iron,
despite their vital role in elevating cell-cultured meat to a
complete meat substitute.65 To the extent that micronutrients
can be successfully added, studies show that introducing
micronutrients to the culture medium may diminish the health
benefits.66 Ultimately, the more additives that are introduced to
the medium, the more “fake” the product will become in the eyes
of the consumer.67
Another safety issue concerns the dysregulation of cell
lines. Multiple cell multiplications of this sort raise a risk of the
kind of cell dysregulation that takes place in cancer cells.68
These deregulated cell lines must be eliminated before
production or human consumption.69 But even if they are
61. See id.
62. See Stephen P. Oliver et al., Impact of Antibiotic Use in Adult Dairy
Cows on Antimicrobial Resistance of Veterinary and Human Pathogens: A
Comprehensive Review, 8 FOODBORNE PATHOGENS & DISEASE 337, 338 (2011)
(“Over the last two decades, antimicrobial resistance associated with
agricultural use of antibiotics and the impending propagation of
antimicrobial-resistant bacteria from food-producing animals to humans has
become a significant global public health concern.”).
63. See Chriki & Hocquette, supra note 26, at 2.
64. See id. at 7 (discussing regulation of conventional farming practices
by the European Union).
65. See id. at 1 (“[T]he control of [cultured meat’s] nutritional composition
is still unclear, especially for micronutrients and iron.”).
66. See id. at 7 (“[C]ontrolling the micronutrient composition of cultured
meat is still a research issue.”).
67. See id. at 3 (“[A]dding chemicals to the medium makes cultured meat
more ‘chemical’ food with less of a clean label.”).
68. See id. (“[G]iven the great number of cell multiplications taking place,
some dysregulation of cell lines is likely to occur as happens in cancer
cells . . . .”).
69. See id. (theorizing that “deregulated cell lines can be eliminated for
production or consumption”).
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eliminated, we do not know how this will affect the muscle
structure, human metabolism, or human health upon
consumption of cell-cultured meat.70
While these concerns bear mentioning, it is far too early to
determine the impact of cell-cultured meat on public health. It
is not as if traditional meat and the related overconsumption of
animals have no health implications. In addition to the
aforementioned risks of disease and food-born illness,
overconsuming saturated animal fat (resulting from
conventional meat) can cause non-infectious diseases, like heart
disease.71 As it relates to the health and safety of cell-cultured
meat, we need more studies and more time to determine
whether or not it is better than conventional meat.
C.

The Benefits of Cell-Cultured Meat

The potential benefits of cell-cultured meat are numerous
and varied. The media has done a great job of espousing these
benefits at every turn.72 The fact of the matter is, however, that
the presentation of these benefits is often very one-sided. Rarely
does the media address any of the studies that show
cell-cultured meat in a less than glorious light.73 Here, I present
a more balanced approach. It would be dishonest to say that
cell-cultured meat’s advantages are so significant that they
merit a change in our regulatory systems without
acknowledging that some scholars dispute the idea that
cell-cultured meat is the godsend that manufacturers say it is.
1.

Environmental Benefits

If cell-cultured meat can be produced at scale, the
environmental impact of meat consumption may dramatically
70. See id. (pointing out that it is difficult to predict how cultured meat
will affect the human body).
71. Hocquette, supra note 38, at 171.
72. See id. at 167 (“The production of in vitro meat regularly generates
media interest because of the contribution it could, at first glance, make to the
issue of feeding humankind while also protecting the environment and
respecting animals.”).
73. See id. at 169 (“[O]pposition to cultured meat . . . or ethical concerns
regarding the production and consumption of in vitro meat are
under-represented in media.”).
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decrease, particularly in the areas of water, land, and energy
use. But the benefits are complicated. In the case of water, for
example, the media tells consumers that 1,590 gallons of fresh
water are required to produce one pound of conventional beef.74
Advocates of cell-cultured meat are thus quick to retort that the
creation of one pound of cultured meat requires no feed and
merely 43.6 gallons of water.75 These numbers are somewhat
disingenuous. In reality, about 95 percent of the fresh water
allocated to beef production in the first statistic is used to grow
crops, plants, and forage that feed the animals.76 The majority
of that water would not be saved if there were no farm animals
on pastures or living on land.77 More honest accounts estimate
that the production of one pound of beef requires 66–84 gallons
of water.78 Even so, under both metrics cell-cultured meat uses
substantially less water than beef production.
Likewise, cell-cultured meat requires significantly less land
for its production. Today more than six billion acres of land are
dedicated to the production of feed for farm animals.79 However,
of the more than six billion acres of land dedicated to the
production of feed, more than three billion of them are
considered non-arable and only suitable for livestock.80 Further,
livestock play a key role in soil health, helping to maintain
carbon content and soil fertility with the organic matter,

74. See Barbara Duckworth, How Much Water Is Required to Produce a
Pound of Beef?, W. PRODUCER (Jan. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/XB8B-VM2T
(reporting on research from the University of Manitoba measuring water use
in livestock production).
75. Jennifer Penn, Comment, “Cultured Meat”: Lab-Grown Beef and
Regulating the Future Meat Market, 36 UCLA J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 104, 106
(2018) (citing Hanna L. Tuomisto & M. Joost Teixeira de Mattos,
Environmental Impacts of Cultured Meat Production, 45 ENV’T SCI. & TECH.
6117, 6117 (2011)).
76. Chriki & Hocquette, supra note 26, at 4.
77. See Michel Doreau et al., Water Use by Livestock: A Global Perspective
for a Regional Issue?, 2 ANIMAL FRONTIERS 9, 10 (2012) (“No evidence exists
that the presence of livestock is related to the risk of water scarcity . . . .”).
78. See Chriki & Hocquette, supra note 26, at 4 (“It is now accepted that
the production of 1 kg of beef will require 550–700 L of water . . . .”).
79. Anne Mottet et al., Livestock: On Our Plates or Eating at Our Table?
A New Analysis of the Feed/Food Debate, 14 GLOB. FOOD SEC. 1, 5 (2017).
80. Id.
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nitrogen, and phosphorus resulting from their manure.81 Some
scientists have argued that comparison of land use between
cell-cultured meat and conventional meat is unfair because
people often ignore the benefits of livestock farming systems,
like carbon storage and the biodiversity of plants and animals.82
Yet, cell-cultured meat will almost certainly slow down existing
levels of deforestation.83
There is also some debate about energy savings. Advocates
argue that much less energy is required to produce cell-cultured
meat, estimating that cell-cultured meat requires up to 45
percent less energy than conventional meat.84 The truth of the
matter is that nobody can say with any certainty how much
energy it will take to create cell-cultured meat at scale, as it will
largely depend on the source of energy the companies choose to
use.85 Ultimately, the water, land, and energy savings resulting
from the switch from conventional meat to cell-cultured meat,
no matter how large, can be diverted directly to humanitarian
needs.
In addition to a beneficial reallocation of resources,
cell-cultured meat is also thought to lessen the production of
greenhouse gases and slow global warming.86 Today, livestock
are responsible for 14.5 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas

81. See id. at 6 (“But livestock also make an indirect contribution to the
bio-economy and overall food output by increasing crop productivity through
manure and draught power.”).
82. See Chriki & Hocquette, supra note 26, at 4 (“[I]t is obvious that
cultured meat will need less land than conventional meat
production . . . . [but] this does not equate to an advantage for cultured
meat . . . .”).
83. See Hanna L. Tuomisto & M. Joost Teixeira de Mattos,
Environmental Impacts of Cultured Meat Production, 45 ENV’T SCI. & TECH.
6117, 6122 (2011) (explaining that a shift to cultured meat could promote
reforestation).
84. See id. at 6121–22 (“[T]he energy input for cultured meat production
is substantially lower compared to conventionally produced beef, sheep, and
pork . . . .”).
85. See id. at 6120 (“In this study, the energy input calculations of
cultured meat production are based on many assumptions and, therefore, have
high uncertainty.”).
86. See id. at 6122 (“The replacement of conventionally produced meat by
cultured meat could potentially contribute toward mitigating [greenhouse gas]
emissions because, instead of clearing more land for agriculture, large land
areas could be reforested or used for other carbon sequestration purposes.”).
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emissions, a significant portion.87 Ruminants, such as cows, and
other herbivores emit methane from their digestive tracts
whenever they eat.88 Cattle farming also produces carbon
dioxide and nitrous oxide.89 The reduction of these three
greenhouse gas emissions would purportedly slow global
warming.90 Unlike conventional meat, the production of
cell-cultured meat will only emit carbon dioxide that originates
from the fossil energy used to warm the cultured cells.91 Again,
on its face, this benefit seems unassailable. However, one recent
study has argued that global warming will only be lessened by
cell-cultured meat initially.92 Eventually the carbon dioxide
emissions associated with cell-cultured meat production will
begin to accumulate in the atmosphere in a way that methane
does not.93 The warming that results from such carbon dioxide
is not only more likely to persist, but it will increase even at a
low level of cell-cultured meat production, exceeding that of
cattle production in some cases.94
The environmental advantage of cell-cultured meat over
conventional meat may be astronomical, minimal, or negligible
depending on whom you ask. As is the case with public health,
87. Amy Quinton, Cows and Climate Change: Making Cattle More
Sustainable, UC DAVIS (June 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/Z7WM-Q6ML.
88. Id.
89. See John Lynch & Raymond Pierrehumbert, Climate Impacts of
Cultured Meat and Beef Cattle, FRONTIERS SUSTAINABLE FOOD SYS., Feb. 19,
2019, at 1, 2 (describing how cattle directly emit methane and nitrous oxide,
and “conversion of land for pasture or feed production” leads to carbon dioxide
emission).
90. See id. at 2 (suggesting that reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
from livestock would likely have a positive effect on the environment).
91. See id. at 1 (“[C]ultured meat emissions are almost entirely [carbon
dioxide] from energy generation.”).
92. See id. at 8 (finding that although initial returns may be promising,
“[r]eplacing cattle systems with cultured meat production before energy
generation is sufficiently decarbonized . . . could risk a long-term, negative
climate impact”).
93. See id. at 8–9 (explaining how carbon dioxide, which cultured meat
production would emit at a higher level than traditional meat production,
lingers in the atmosphere longer than other greenhouse gases like methane,
creating a “warming legacy”).
94. See id. at 10 (“The scale of cattle production for the very high levels of
beef consumption modeled here would result in significant global warming,
but it is not yet clear whether cultured meat production would provide a more
climatically sustainable alternative.”).

1746

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1729 (2022)

it is too early to say with any certainty. However, the apparent
consensus in the literature is that shifting to cellular agriculture
will bring some environmental benefits.95
2.

Social Benefits

Aside from global warming, an increase in cell-cultured
meat consumption might help the world with another
burgeoning problem: feeding the rapidly growing world
population. Rapid population growth has resulted in a global
population of 7.7 billion that is expected to surpass 9.7 billion by
2050.96 According to the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), feeding these additional two billion people will require
70 percent more food, despite the existing resource and arable
land limitations.97 Moreover, the demand for meat has increased
at a greater rate than global population as the growing number
of middle-class consumers in countries like China, India, and
Russia more frequently seek luxury goods, including meat,
cheese, and other animal products.98 Current agriculture
methods are ill-equipped to sustain current levels of meat
consumption.99
Many believe that cell-cultured meat can help address
global food and nutrition insecurity by producing a larger
quantity of high-quality, affordable meat in a more efficient

95. See id. at 1 (“Reducing the environmental impacts of meat production,
and particularly greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, is generally highlighted as
a significant potential advantage of cultured meat.”).
96. Growing at a Slower Pace, World Population Is Expected to Reach 9.7
Billion in 2050, UNITED NATIONS (June 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/SFX77ARK.
97. See UN: Farmers Must Produce 70% More Food by 2050 to Feed
Population, GUARDIAN (Nov. 28, 2011), https://perma.cc/SBQ2-TKCN.
98. See David Abler, Demand Growth in Developing Countries, OECD
FOOD AGRIC. & FISHERIES PAPERS No. 29, at 1 (2010) (finding that, consistent
with economic growth in Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, and China, those
countries exhibit a lower elasticity of demand for meat and other luxury food
items).
99. See UN: Farmers Must Produce 70% More Food by 2050 to Feed
Population, supra note 97 (“[T]o meet the world’s future food needs, a major
‘sustainable intensification’ of agricultural productivity on existing farmland
will be necessary . . . .”).
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manner than traditional and factory farming methods.100
Beyond meeting the needs of the growing population and
growing global middle class, the cost associated with the
production of cell-cultured meat would, ideally, come down to a
level that is globally accessible for low-income people as well.101
3.

Animal Welfare

Today, ethical concerns exist at almost every stage of
livestock production and concern for animal welfare is a growing
priority in Western societies. Many people are turned off by the
low standards of care on cattle feedlots and in pig and poultry
industrial production units that lead to overcrowding and
inhumane conditions.102 Because the number of animals
necessary for slaughter will decrease substantially with the
production of cell-cultured meat, many animal rights defenders
have become cell-cultured meat advocates.103 They describe the
product as “victim-less meat.”104 Yet, cell-cultured meat brings
its own ethical concerns. Harvesting the cells is an invasive,
nonconsensual procedure, and some animal rights groups find
this practice problematic.105 As between the two options, the
consensus seems to be that mass production farming is worse

100. See Penn, supra note 75, at 112–13 (hypothesizing that cultured meat
may play a key role in resolving humanitarian concerns).
101. See Brian Kateman, Will Cultured Meat Soon Be a Common Sight in
Supermarkets Across the Globe?, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2020, 8:58 AM),
https://perma.cc/7G68-6ME2 (reporting that although the first fake burger
cost $325,000 to make, one company “hopes to get cost down to $10 per pound
by 2022”).
102. See
Factory
Farming:
Misery
for
Animals,
PETA,
https://perma.cc/DJ4Z-74RT (“In the U.S. today, 99% of animals used for food
live on massive industrial ‘factory farms,’ where they’re crammed by the
thousands into wire cages, metal crates, or other extremely restrictive
enclosures inside filthy, windowless sheds.”).
103. See Zuhaib Fayaz Bhat et al., In Vitro Meat Production: Challenges
and Benefits Over Conventional Meat Production, 14 J. INTEGRATIVE AGRIC.
241, 241 (2015) (remarking that in vitro meat production is “winning the
favour of animal rights activists for its humane production of meat”).
104. Id. at 243.
105. See id. at 247 (presenting an argument “that in vitro meat [uses]
original cells gathered from some animal in a morally suspect way and that
the use of such cells will morally taint all future generations of tissue”).
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for animals’ quality of life than slating one animal to undergo a
biopsy to collect cells while under anesthesia.106
Ultimately, a neutral weighing of pros against cons of
cell-cultured meat shows that cell-cultured meat has fewer
negative impacts on the environment, society, and the ethical
treatment of animals than conventional meat. Cell-cultured
meat is thus being touted as the way of the future, a viable
solution to the many concerns of conventional meat production
that will fill the gap between meat supply and demand.107 These
potential benefits, among others, have generated excitement
around these new food products.108
4.

Economic Benefits

Cellular agriculture generally, and cell-cultured meat
specifically, is poised to disrupt an important part of the U.S.
economy.109 The top seven publicly traded U.S. meat companies
have a combined $71 billion valuation.110 In 2018, the combined
revenue of the top one hundred U.S. meat and poultry
processors totaled $226.6 billion.111 Moreover, market analysts
project that global demand for animal-based foods is expected to
rise by nearly 70 percent by 2050.112
While cell-cultured meat is only a tiny portion of the meat
market today, its potential for growth is unlimited and the
106. See id. (concluding that, among other positives, improved animal
welfare is a generally-accepted benefit of cultured meat production).
107. See id. (recognizing that “in vitro meat production system holds great
promises as an alternative to conventional meat production”).
108. See, e.g., Michael Pellman Rowland, Exciting New Partnership
Creates a Blueprint for Sustainable Meat, FORBES (Jul. 30, 2018),
https://perma.cc/WYW4-ZEUB (describing popular enthusiasm for the
cell-cultured meat).
109. Our Meatless Future: How the $2.7T Global Meat Market Gets
Disrupted, CB INSIGHTS RSCH. (July 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/B8CZ-AT6C
(discussing the threat to traditional meat market caused by increase demand
for artificial meat).
110. Our Meatless Future: How the $90B Global Meat Market Gets
Disrupted, MEDIUM (Nov. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/M57F-KRUX.
111. Sam Gazdziak, The 2018 Top 100 Meat and Poultry Processors, NAT’L
PROVISIONER (May 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/TK5W-NNB7.
112. TIM SEARCHINGER ET AL., CREATING A SUSTAINABLE FOOD FUTURE: A
MENU OF SOLUTIONS TO FEED NEARLY 10 BILLION PEOPLE BY 2050, at 1 (2018),
https://perma.cc/4DEJ-JR8B (PDF).
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industry, though not nearly as established as the beef industry,
is both rapidly growing and well-supported.113 As interest in
cell-cultured meat has grown, so has investor interest in the
industry. Tyson Foods, for example, is one of the leading
producers of pork and chicken in the United States and has
invested in two cultured meat start-ups, Upside Foods (formerly
Memphis Meats) and Future Meat Technologies.114 Tyson also
launched Tyson New Ventures LLC, a venture capital branch of
the corporation tasked with investing in innovative meat
products.115 Cargill, one of the largest producers of the country’s
beef, is also an investor in Upside Foods.116 One research firm
estimates that the cultured meat industry is projected to reach
$20 million by 2027.117 Cell-cultured meat companies in the
United States are positioned to grow exponentially if they can
capture a share of the world’s market.118
Given the alleged wide-ranging benefits associated with
cell-cultured meat, including those for the American economy, it
is vital to develop a cogently dynamic regulatory system that
ensures the product’s safety without compromising the
likelihood of its purchase and consumption. Much of the
industry’s success hangs on how successfully it can develop a
market for these products.119 This is a significant hurdle to

113. Financial contributions from the likes of Richard Branson and Bill
Gates, combined with marketing from companies such as Tyson and Cargill,
have placed many of the industry’s start-ups in a position ripe for success. See
Chloe Sorvino, Tyson Invests in Lab-Grown Protein Startup Memphis Meats,
Joining Bill Gates and Richard Branson, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2018, 10:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/2MRU-WBA9.
114. Jonathan Shieber, Tyson Foods Investment Arm Backs Another
Lab-Grown Meat Manufacturer, TECHCRUNCH (May 2, 2018, 11:03 AM),
https://perma.cc/W9FG-NLLM.
115. See id. (“The venture investment arm of massive meat manufacturer
Tyson Foods is continuing its push into potential alternative methods of
poultry production . . . .”).
116. See Sorvino, supra note 113.
117. Kat Smith, Clean Meat Market Set to Hit $20 Million in Value by
2027, LIVE KINDLY, https://perma.cc/JB9M-XQ22.
118. There are presently cell-cultured meat companies in the United
States, Israel, the Netherlands, Spain, and Japan. See Rhonda K. Miller, A
2020 Synopsis of the Cell-Cultured Animal Industry, 10 ANIMAL FRONTIERS 64,
68 (2020).
119. See Our Meatless Future: How the $2.7T Global Meat Market Gets
Disrupted, supra note 109 (“The greatest concentration of alternative meat
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overcome, even without the government’s propensity to
overcomplicate things.120 The U.S. government has a history of
mismanaging emerging technology, especially in the food
industry; see, for example, the decades-long debate and
litigation over the naming of alternative milk products, such as
soy milk and almond milk.121 It would be a mistake for our
regulatory authorities to unnecessarily complicate the
regulatory landscape, exacerbating an already tenuous
relationship between cell-cultured meat manufacturers and the
beef and cattle lobby.122
II. THE RACE TO REGULATE CELL-CULTURED MEAT
Before cell-cultured meat can reach a grocery store shelf, it
must first be scrutinized against the existing regulatory
frameworks. This process began in early 2018, when both the
FDA, an agency of the Department of Health and Human
Services, and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), an
agency of the USDA, announced their intention to regulate
cell-cultured meat.123 On April 18, 2018, USDA Secretary Sonny
Perdue testified before Congress that any product labeled as
meat, including cell-cultured meat, fell under the sole purview
deals has occurred in the US . . . [a]t the same time, there are also developed
and fast-growing meatless markets in Europe and Asia.”).
120. See Brian Kateman, If the U.S. Is a Nation of Innovation, Why Aren’t
We Embracing Cell-Cultured Meat?, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2021, 9:39 AM),
https://perma.cc/R393-3L78 (describing U.S. cell-cultured meat companies as
“wait[ing] with their hands tied for the U.S. government to give them the green
light”).
121. The dairy industry has long argued that the term milk should not be
applied to plant-based products (e.g., almond milk or soy milk). See Iselin
Gambert, Got Mylk?: The Disruptive Possibilities of Plant Milk, 84 BROOK. L.
REV. 801, 802 (2019). To do so, they argue, is misleading and violates the FDA
standards of identity for milk. Id. at 814–15. The Dairy Pride Act introduced
in the 115th Congress would have limited the use of the term milk. H.R. 778,
115th Cong. (2017); S. 130, 115th Cong. (2017). In July 2018, the FDA also
announced that it would review the labeling of plant-based milk and yogurt
products. See Alexander Nieves, Gottlieb: FDA to Crack Down on Labeling
Nondairy Products as “Milk”, POLITICO (July 17, 2018, 11:25 AM),
https://perma.cc/5D2S-NV6T.
122. See Kateman, supra note 120 (“Instead of standing in the way, the
U.S. could be championing cell-cultured meat as a solution to our urgent public
health and environmental crises.”).
123. See GREENE & ANGADJIVAND, supra note 17, at 1.
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of the USDA.124 Seemingly in agreement with the USDA, in May
of 2018, the House Appropriations Committee reported a bill
requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate “products
made from cells of amenable species of livestock, as defined in
the Federal Meat Inspection Act, or poultry, as defined in the
Poultry Products Inspection [A]ct, grown under controlled
conditions for use as human food.”125 Further, the
Appropriations Committee mandated the Secretary to “issue
regulations prescribing the type and frequency of inspection
required for the manufacture and processing of such products,
as well as other requirements necessary to prevent the
adulteration and misbranding of these products” for fiscal year
2018 and thereafter.126 In direct opposition to this measure, the
FDA issued its own statement in June 2018, claiming that,
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the
FDA would be solely responsible for the regulation of
cell-cultured meat.127 After much back and forth and a joint
public meeting on the issue,128 the agencies issued a joint

124. It is worth pointing out that Secretary Perdue first formulated this
opinion after receiving a petition from the U.S. Cattlemen’s Association asking
the USDA, via the Food Safety and Inspection Service, to establish labeling
requirements differentiating cell-cultured meat products from traditional
meat products, which are derived from the carcasses of slaughtered animals.
See id. at 2 (detailing Secretary Perdue’s testimony and providing a timeline
of relevant events).
125. H.R. 5961, 115th Cong. (2018).
126. Id. This language received some pushback in the House. The minority
views of Representatives Nita Lowey (D-NY) and Sanford Bishop, Jr. (D-GA)
show that there was an amendment to strike this language from the bill
because such a determination before the products were commercially available
was premature and beyond the scope of a single appropriations bill. This
suggests that at least some appropriators agree that the manner of regulation
of cell-cultured meat remains to be determined. See H.R. REP NO. 115-706, at
183 (2018).
127. See GREENE & ANGADJIVAND, supra note 17, at 2 (“FDA Commissioner
Gottlieb issued a statement on cell-cultured meat announcing that under the
FDCA, the FDA has oversight over cell-cultured meat.”). The FDA also called
for a public meeting on cell-cultured meat that it hosted and moderated
without the USDA. Id. This meeting, “Food Produced Using Animal Cell
Culture Technology,” was held in Washington, D.C. on July 12, 2018. Id.
128. See Joint Public Meeting on the Use of Cell Culture Technology to
Develop Products Derived from Livestock and Poultry, FDA (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://perma.cc/EDL9-795F (providing meeting recordings and copies of
presentations).
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statement on November 16, 2018, announcing a shared system
of regulatory oversight of cell-cultured meat.129
Under the terms of the agreement, the agencies will have
both compartmentalized and shared roles. The FDA will
evaluate
production
materials
and
processes,
and
manufacturing
controls,
using
existing
rules
and
regulations—including facility registration, the Current Good
Manufacturing Practices and preventive controls regulation,
and any other requirements applicable to substances that will
become food (or components of food).130 The FDA must share its
results with the USDA before a product is approved for
market.131 The FDA will also oversee cell collection, cell banks,
and cell growth and differentiation.132 During the cell harvest
stage, oversight will shift from the FDA to the USDA.133 Here,
the FDA is supposed to disclose to the USDA whether the
harvested cells are eligible for processing into meat or poultry
products worthy of bearing the USDA mark of inspection.134 The
proposed scheme also authorizes the FDA to develop additional
requirements on cell bank and cell culturing facility conditions
and processes as necessary to ensure that the biological
materials are safe and not adulterated under the FDCA, and to
conduct follow-up activities and enforcement actions to
guarantee the same.135
The USDA will then be responsible for the oversight of
production and the labeling of food products derived from the
cells of livestock and poultry.136 Specifically, the USDA must
inspect any cell-harvesting establishment that uses livestock or
129. During the meeting, FDA and USDA officials discussed their
respective regulatory frameworks and how each could be applied to ensure the
safety of cell-cultured meat. See Press Announcement, Statement from USDA
Secretary Perdue and FDA Commissioner Gottlieb on the Regulation of
Cell-Cultured Food Products from Cell Lines of Livestock and Poultry (Nov.
16, 2018), https://perma.cc/73E8-MS5A.
130. Formal Agreement Between FDA and USDA, supra note 20 (outlining
the FDA’s pre-market evaluation process).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id. (explaining that each organization that harvests cells from
meat or poultry must obtain a certificate of inspection from the USDA).
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poultry subject to FMIA or Poultry Products Inspection Act
(PPIA)137 oversight, along with any establishment that
processes the cells, or packages and labels the resulting human
food products.138 These establishments must carry the
appropriate marks of inspection.139 The USDA must also use
existing FSIS regulations (including sanitation and physical
product inspection, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
(HACCP) verification, product testing, and records review) to
ensure that “resulting products are safe, unadulterated,
wholesome and properly labeled.”140 Any labels that appear on
cell-cultured food products derived from livestock and poultry
are to be both preapproved and verified in accordance with FSIS
regulations.141 The proposed scheme also authorizes the USDA
to develop additional requirements on safety and labeling as
necessary, and to conduct enforcement actions to ensure that
misbranded, mislabeled, and adulterated products do not enter
the market or, if they do, that they are quickly removed when
identified.142
The key for success in this joint venture will be openness.
Both agencies must share information and collaborate with each
other under the terms of the agreement.143 The agencies have
openly stated that they intend to work together to guarantee
that the actions of both agencies are consistent and
transparent.144 According to the FDA, this approach “will
leverage both the FDA’s experience regulating cell-culture

137. 21 U.S.C. §§ 451–473.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. (“USDA-FSIS will . . . [r]equire that the labeling of human
food products derived from the cultured cells of livestock and poultry be
preapproved and then verified through inspection, as required by FSIS
regulations.”).
142. See id. (providing that the USDA may, “[a]s needed, develop
additional requirements to ensure the safety and accurate labeling of human
food products derived from the cultured cells of livestock and poultry subject
to the FMIA and PPIA”).
143. See id. (highlighting, throughout the agreement, a collaborative
working arrangement between the two agencies).
144. See id. (“The Parties will develop joint principles for product labeling
and claims to ensure that products are labeled consistently and
transparently.”).
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technology and living biosystems and the USDA’s expertise in
regulating livestock and poultry products for human
consumption.”145 Further, the agencies are confident that they
can successfully implement this regulatory framework using
existing statutory authority, which will ensure the safety of
these products without the need for new legislation on the
topic.146 The rationale for these justifications seems to score one
for efficiency in oversight and one for expediency of process.
The agreement, as established between the two agencies
alone, was formalized on March 7, 2019.147 Then, in December
2019, senators from Wyoming and Montana introduced the Food
Safety Modernization for Innovative Technologies Act,148
seeking to codify the terms of that agreement.149 The Act would
amend the FDCA to add a new section specifically regarding
“Food Produced Using Animal Cell Culture Technology,” and
would require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
collaborate with the Secretary of Agriculture on overseeing food
that is intended for human consumption and produced using
animal cell-culture technology (specifically those cell lines
derived from livestock or poultry).150 At no point did any other
agency or congressional source question the agencies’ decision
to share oversight. Instead, to the extent that there was
commentary, the government focused on how it would
accomplish shared oversight. 151
145. Press Announcement, supra note 129.
146. See id. (“Because our agencies have the statutory authority necessary
to appropriately regulate cell-cultured food products derived from livestock
and poultry the [FDA] does not believe that legislation on this topic is
necessary.”).
147. Formal Agreement Between FDA and USDA, supra note 20.
148. S. 3053, 116th Cong. (2019).
149. The bill was introduced on December 16, 2019, in the Senate, where
it was read twice and then referred to the Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry. All Actions § S.3053—116th Congress (2019-2020),
CONGRESS.GOV (2019), https://perma.cc/C49N-DMD4. There has been no
movement on the bill since then. Id.
150. See S. 3053, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019) (detailing the proposed
amendment to the FDCA).
151. Since then, only one federal body has spoken on the regulation of
cell-cultured meat. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a
report—FDA and USDA Could Strengthen Existing Efforts to Prepare for
Oversight of Cell-Cultured Meat—in April 2020. See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-325, FDA AND USDA COULD STRENGTHEN
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The story, when told in this way, seems like a most
propitious turn of events. After an initial regulatory turf war,
the agencies jointly decided to work together towards a common
goal, capitalize on their own expertise, and introduce no new
regulations to oversee this new food technology.152 This
explanation may be either overly optimistic or overly simplistic.
Serious questions remain. Aside from the looming question of
whether public agencies should voluntarily cede power at their
own discretion,153 one must ask whether the USDA’s

EXISTING EFFORTS TO PREPARE FOR OVERSIGHT OF CELL-CULTURED MEAT 1
(2020). The GAO made three distinct recommendations to the FDA and USDA:
(1) the Commissioner of the FDA and the Secretary of Agriculture should more
fully incorporate the seven leading practices for effective collaboration in the
agencies’ interagency agreement for the joint oversight of cell-cultured meat;
(2) as the three cell-cultured meat working groups move forward, the
Commissioner of the FDA and the Secretary of Agriculture should more fully
incorporate the seven leading practices for effective collaboration, such as
identifying specific outcomes and a way to monitor and evaluate progress
toward outcomes; and (3) the Commissioner of the FDA and the Secretary of
Agriculture should clearly document in their interagency agreement, or other
publicly available document, which agency will oversee cell-cultured seafood
other than catfish. Id. at 31–32. The GAO’s insistence on the seven leading
practices for effective collaboration is notable.
152. See GREENE & ANGADJIVAND, supra note 17, at 1–2. Whether it is truly
possible to regulate a novel food product (with no comparators) without a
single new regulation is debatable.
153. According to Jason Marisam, Minnesota Assistant Attorney General
and former law professor, both the Constitution and the Economy Act, 31
U.S.C. § 1535 (2006), constrain exchanges in this interagency marketplace.
See Jason Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886, 888
(2012). Under the Constitution, if Congress has specifically delegated
authority to an agency, that agency cannot redelegate that authority. Id. at
887. Likewise, an agency cannot transfer funds appropriated by Congress to
another agency. Id. The Economy Act further limits the agencies by providing
rules and procedures to govern the marketplace. Id. Significantly, the Act
prohibits the redelegation of tasks unless (1) the agency retains responsibility
over the tasks, (2) tasks are not part of the agency’s primary administrative
function, and (3) tasks do not involve significant decision-making authority.
Id. at 888. Whether the FDA’s agreement to give labeling authority to the
USDA can be seen as a redelegation is beyond the scope of this Article. It is
worth noting that, to the extent it can, the more significant and central to the
agency’s core mission a regulatory power is, the less likely it is that it can be
redelegated under the Economy Act. See id. at 906. There is no doubt that the
FDA is also responsible for regulating safety issues associated with animal
cell-culture technology, such as growing organs. See GAO-20-325, supra note
151, at 2. It is unclear why the technology should be distinguished from the
end product in this space, but not in any others.
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involvement in the regulation of cell-cultured meat is either
necessary or appropriate.
III. THE USDA’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGULATION OF
CELL-CULTURED MEAT IS INAPPROPRIATE
Both the FDA and the USDA play an important role in
providing for the safety of human food.154 The USDA is
responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the
FMIA, the PPIA, and the Egg Products Inspection Act.155 Under
these authorities, the USDA regulates the meat that comes from
amenable species, like: cattle, hogs, sheep, goats, equines,
poultry (chicken, turkeys, ducks, geese, squab, guinea fowl, and
ratites), catfish, and egg products.156 In other words, the USDA
oversees domestic and imported meat and poultry (excluding
game meat), meat- or poultry-containing products (such as
stews, pizzas, and frozen foods), processed egg products (liquid,
frozen, or dried), and catfish.157 The FDA, on the other hand, is
responsible for all other foods, including: game meat, fish and
seafood (excluding catfish), processed meat products (containing
2-to-3 percent meat), and shell eggs.158 The FDA, in other words,
oversees all domestic and imported food sold across state lines,
except for meat and poultry.159
Because regulating the country’s food is such a large task
and because the delegations of authority are broad, oversight
154. Although it is not relevant to this Article, it bears mentioning that a
number of other agencies are also involved with protecting the U.S. food
supply, such as the Centers for Disease Control and the Environmental
Protection Agency, to name a few. See About FSIS: Food Safety Agencies &
Partners, USDA (2019), https://perma.cc/4MG6-W9QK.
155. 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031–1056 (2018).
156. See GAO-20-325, supra note 151, at 2.
157. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-213, OVERSIGHT OF
FOOD SAFETY ACTIVITIES: FEDERAL AGENCIES SHOULD PURSUE OPPORTUNITIES
TO REDUCE OVERLAP AND BETTER LEVERAGE RESOURCES 2 (2005)
https://perma.cc/E89G-KY67 (PDF) (“USDA is responsible for ensuring the
safety of meat, poultry, and certain egg products . . . .”).
158. Id.
159. The FDA implements and enforces the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i), the Food Safety Modernization Act (21
U.S.C. §§ 2201–2257), the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
§§ 201300mm), and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (15 U.S.C. § 1451–
1461). See GAO-05-213, supra note 157, at 1.

WHAT’S THE BEEF?

1757

often overlaps between the FDA and the USDA. Take soup for
example. The USDA will inspect a canning facility that produces
food containing meat and poultry.160 The FDA will also inspect
that same facility if it produces canned soups that contain beans
or seafood.161 Packaged sandwiches present another interesting
example. The USDA regulates open-faced sandwiches so long as
the ratio of meat to bread (and other ingredients) is more than
50 percent.162 Yet, the FDA regulates closed sandwiches, those
with two slices of bread,163 because the ratio of meat to other
ingredients is less than 50 percent.164
Overlap in oversight in the case of cell-cultured meat,
however, is completely unnecessary and will certainly lead to
problems with implementation. There are three primary
reasons that the USDA and the FMIA are not the appropriate
governing body and mechanism for cell-cultured meat. First,
cell-culturing is outside the scope of the USDA’s mandate, and
the agency’s oversight expertise in this context is largely
irrelevant. The FMIA’s primary purpose is to prevent meat
adulteration or contamination.165 The greatest risk of
contamination to cell-cultured meat will occur in the lab, which
is under FDA oversight. Second, the FMIA may be read to
proscribe USDA oversight of cell-cultured meat. Finally, since
the broader law and policy arena have already distinguished
cell-cultured meat from conventional meat, the USDA should
160. See id. at 16 (“For example, USDA inspects a canning facility at least
daily if it produces food containing meat and poultry.”).
161. See id. (“If the facility also produces canned soups containing beans
or seafood, FDA inspects it every 1 to 5 years.”).
162. See USDA, FOOD STANDARDS AND LABELING POLICY BOOK 155 (2005),
https://perma.cc/E895-QN93 (PDF) [hereinafter FOOD STANDARDS AND
LABELING POLICY BOOK] (defining open-faced sandwiches as “contain[ing] at
least 50 percent cooked meat” and noting that “[s]andwiches are amenable
only if they are open faced sandwiches”).
163. See Meg Marco, US Food Safety Is Broken: Different Agencies Oversee
Open-Faced vs. Closed-Faced Sandwiches, CONSUMERIST (Feb. 1, 2007, 7:35
PM), https://perma.cc/ZE9V-ZD96 (citing a GAO report that says “FDA
inspects manufacturers of packaged closed-face . . . sandwiches (e.g., those
with two slices of bread)”).
164. See FOOD STANDARDS AND LABELING POLICY BOOK, supra note 162, at
155 (identifying that closed sandwiches are not amenable to inspection
because they “contain at least 35 percent cooked meat and no more than 50
percent bread”).
165. See 21 U.S.C. § 602.
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decline responsibility for labeling to preserve horizontal
coherence. It stands to reason that if cell-cultured meat is not
technically meat, as has been established elsewhere in law and
policy (often with tacit approval from the USDA), then the
allocation of labeling authority to the USDA is improper and
impermissible.
A. USDA Mandates and Concomitant Problems
1.

The Multiple Mandate Problem

Given the structure of the United States government and
its reliance on federal agencies for a large swath of governance,
many federal agencies are assigned multiple mandates.
Occasionally, these mandates conflict. For example, the
National Park Service must protect the natural resources of the
federal parks and permit their public use and accessibility to
visitors.166 The Federal Aviation Administration must
“encourage the development of civil aeronautics” and provide for
the safety of air commerce.167 How should the National Park
Service act if the best way to preserve our national parks is to
close them to visitors?168 What should the Federal Aviation
Administration do if it finds that civilian-operated drones pose
a large threat to the safety of public airways, but their use is the
best way to expand our air transportation network and provide
for its economic growth? Similar questions and concerns
reverberate throughout the regulatory sphere.

166. See 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (setting the Park Service’s responsibility to
“conserve the scenery, natural and historic objects, and the wild life [therein]
and to provide for the enjoyment of [the same] in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations”).
167. See 49 U.S.C. § 40104(a) (“The Administrator of the [FAA] shall
encourage . . . safety of air commerce in and outside the United States.”).
168. Congress will, on occasion, provide guidance on how to balance
conflicting mandates. In the case of the Park Service, for example, Congress
prioritizes conservation over the enjoyment of visitors. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 668ee(1) (explaining that “compatible use” “means a wildlife-dependent
recreational use or any other use of a refuge that, in the sound professional
judgement of the Director, will not materially interfere with or detract from
the fulfillment of the mission of the System or the purposes of the refuge”).
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In these instances, agencies must make tradeoffs between
two congressionally mandated goals.169 Professor Eric Biber,
after an extensive review of economic and political science
literature on the subject of principal-agent interactions, argues
that federal agencies (acting as agents of Congress, the
President, and the general public) with conflicting tasks “will
systematically overperform on the tasks that are easier to
measure and have higher incentives, and underperform on the
tasks that are harder to measure and have lower incentives.”170
Once an agency prioritizes one goal over another, it becomes
easier for that agency to continue to privilege that same goal
going forward.171
2.

The USDA’s Congressional Mandate

The thirty-seventh Congress of the United States
established the Department of Agriculture, and President
Abraham Lincoln signed the Act into law, in 1862.172 The
enabling statute requires the USDA “to acquire and to diffuse
among the people of the United States useful information on
subjects connected with agriculture in the most general and
comprehensive sense of that word, and to procure, propagate,
and distribute among the people new and valuable seeds and
plants.”173 The Commissioner of Agriculture was tasked with
acquiring any knowledge on the science of agriculture; sourcing
new and valuable seed varieties to cultivate, propagate, and
distribute; and reporting to Congress.174 At its inception, the
organization’s mission was primarily focused on improving
agricultural productivity through scientific research, farm
169. See Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the
Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 3 (2009)
(explaining, for example, how the National Park Service must balance the
harms of air pollution with wanting visitors to drive to national parks).
170. Id. at 9.
171. See id. at 3 (offering, as an example, the federal public land
management agencies, which “have been accused of systematically privileging
one or more of their goals—often related to economic development—over
others—often related to environmental protection”).
172. Act to Establish a Department of Agriculture, ch. 72, 12 Stat. 387
(1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2201).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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technology (including new seed varieties), and information on
farming practices.175
Absent from the USDA’s original congressional mandate is
any discussion of financial support for farmers.176 The
Department was not assigned responsibility for the stabilization
of farm incomes and rural development until the Great
Depression and the New Deal.177 To stabilize the downwardly
spiraling wheat and cotton prices in the period leading up to the
Great Depression, President Herbert Hoover established the
Farm Board via the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929.178 To
accomplish these goals, the Board was to set a price floor, and
when the price of grain and cotton fell below the established
threshold, the Board would buy and hold the surplus grain and
cotton in storage and then resell it later when the prices
rebounded.179 Later, as part of the New Deal, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933.180 The Act provided subsidies to farmers who agreed not
to plant certain crops or to kill off certain livestock.181 The goal
of this policy was to prop up prices by reducing supply.182

175. Id.
176. See JAYSON L. LUSK, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE USDA IN THE FOOD
AND AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY 13 (2016), https://perma.cc/M6B2-H27P (PDF)
(“Food safety, financial support for farmers, and environmental objectives
were not a part of the USDA’s initial focus.”).
177. See id. at 13–14 (documenting the USDA’s transition from farm
innovation to farmer support during the New Deal).
178. Pub. L. No. 71-10, 46 Stat. 11 (1929).
179. See Kyle Engel, An Examination of Several Aspects of Federal Farm
Legislation, 31 S.D. L. REV. 341, 343 (1986) (explaining the Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1929’s mechanisms, including paying each farmer for his
share of his crop).
180. Pub. L. No 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933).
181. See Harold F. Breimyer, Agricultural Philosophies and Policies in the
New Deal, 68 MINN. L. REV. 333, 343 (1984) (explaining the process under the
Act by which farmers were offered compensation for voluntarily suspending
production of surplus crops).
182. See Guadalupe T. Luna, The New Deal and Food Insecurity in the
“Midst of Plenty”, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 213, 234 (2004) (documenting the
Agricultural Adjustment Act’s original goal of reducing supply to increase
prices).
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Although the Supreme Court eventually ruled the Act
unconstitutional,183 it was in fact the nation’s first farm bill.184
The USDA’s shift from purveyor of technological innovation
to farmer support system marked a clear departure for the
agency. By 1933, the Department could no longer claim to
represent the interest of the American people but instead
represented the interests of the American farmer. Further, the
Department’s attempts to stabilize farm incomes and support
the sale of agriculture firmly aligned the agency with the
business side of industry. After almost a century of new
mandates, policy initiatives, and programs, the Department’s
ties to the agriculture industry have become much clearer.
While it is now nearly impossible to provide a concise mandate
for the USDA, Congress appeared to attempt it with the
introduction of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade
Act of 1990,185 which authorizes many of the Department’s
modern programs. There, Congress describes the mandate of the
agency as: “to extend and revise agricultural price supports and
related programs, to provide for agricultural export, resource
conservation, farm credit, and agricultural research and related
programs, to ensure consumers an abundance of food and fiber
at reasonable prices and for other purposes.”186 In simpler
terms, the Department seeks to maximize profits and minimize
losses within the various agricultural sectors. These goals are
totally wound up in the business of agriculture.
Beyond the congressional mandate, the Department’s own
mission statement is telling. The Department “ha[s] a vision to
provide economic opportunity through innovation, helping rural
America to thrive; to promote agriculture production that better
nourishes Americans while also helping feed others throughout
the world; and to preserve our Nation’s natural resources
through conservation, restored forests, improved watersheds,

183. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (holding that the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was unconstitutional because it
impermissibly infringed on states’ rights by regulating agriculture—a purely
“local” subject).
184. See LUSK, supra note 176, at 15.
185. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101–624, 104 Stat. 3359.
186. Id. pmbl., 104 Stat. at 3359.

1762

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1729 (2022)

and healthy private working lands.”187 To accomplish these
goals, the Department has established several primary working
areas. These include: (1) Farm Production and Conservation;188
(2) Food, Nutrition, and Consumer Services;189 (3) Food
Safety;190 (4) Marketing and Regulatory Programs;191 (5)
Natural Resources and Environment;192 (6) Research,
Education, and Economics;193 (7) Rural Development;194 and (8)
Trade and Foreign Agricultural Affairs.195 For purposes of this
187. About the U.S. Department of Agriculture, supra note 11.
188. See Mission Areas, USDA, https://perma.cc/F52G-SCSQ (“FPAC
agencies implement programs designed to mitigate the significant risks of
farming through crop insurance services, conservation programs and technical
assistance, and commodity, lending, and disaster programs.”).
189. See id.
Food, Nutrition, and Consumer Services works to harness the
Nation’s agricultural abundance to end hunger and improve health
in the United States. Its agencies administer federal domestic
nutrition assistance programs and the Center for Nutrition Policy
and Promotion, which links scientific research to the nutrition
needs of consumers through science-based dietary guidance,
nutrition policy coordination, and nutrition education.
190. See id. (“Food Safety ensures that the Nation’s commercial supply of
meat, poultry, and egg products is safe, wholesome, and properly labeled, and
packaged.”).
191. See id. (“Marketing and Regulatory Programs facilitates domestic and
international marketing of U.S. agricultural products and ensures the health
and care of animals and plants.”).
192. See id. (“Natural Resources and Environment ensures the health of
the land through sustainable management. Its agency works to prevent
damage to natural resources and the environment, restore the resource base,
and promote good land management.”).
193. See id. (noting that the Research, Education, and Economics group “is
dedicated to the creation of a safe, sustainable, competitive U.S. food and fiber
system, as well as strong communities, families, and youth through integrated
research, analysis, and education”).
194. See id.
Rural Development is committed to helping improve the economy
and quality of life in all of rural America by providing financial
programs to support essential public facilities and services [such]
as water and sewer systems, housing, health clinics, emergency
service facilities and electric and telephone service. Rural
Development promotes economic development by providing loans to
businesses through banks and community-managed lending pools,
while also assisting communities to participate in community
empowerment programs.
195. See id.
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Article, Food, Nutrition, and Consumer Services and Food
Safety are the most important working areas. Food, Nutrition,
and Consumer Services works, in part, to “improve health in the
United States,” while Food Safety “ensures that the Nation’s
commercial supply of meat, poultry, and egg products is safe,
wholesome, and properly labeled, and packaged.”196
3.

The Department’s Mixed Mandate

As the USDA continues to suffer from mission creep, more
and more of its multiple objectives conflict. Paradoxically, the
Department must:
(1) increase the efficiency of agricultural production to
produce more food at a lower cost, while trying to reduce
obesity and promote organic practices that lower yields and
increase costs; (2) help small, minority, and beginning
farmers and promote farmers markets, while trying to
ensure food security for the nation and promoting exports to
consumers elsewhere; (3) pay producers to remove
environmentally sensitive lands from production, which
increases food prices and thus the amount of assistance
needed by low-income households; and (4) create nutritional
guidelines that recommend eating fewer animal products,
while helping fund promotional campaigns that encourage
consumption of those products and conducting research that
makes such products less expensive.197

The primary conflict at issue here arises when the dictates
of the USDA mandates require the Department to support
either an industry or the public.198 Said differently, the
Trade and Foreign Agricultural Affairs’ (TFAA) role is to provide
our farmers and ranchers with opportunities to compete in the
global marketplace. TFAA is the Department’s lead on trade policy
with primary responsibility to ensure USDA speaks with a unified
voice on international agriculture issues domestically and abroad.
Within TFAA, the Foreign Agricultural Service is the lead U.S.
agency tasked with promoting exports of U.S. agricultural products
through market intelligence, trade policy, trade capacity building,
and trade promotion programs.
196. Id.
197. LUSK, supra note 176, at 53–54.
198. See COURTNEY I. P. THOMAS, IN FOOD WE TRUST 72–73 (2014)
(discussing the profit-maximizing strategies of industry players and how profit
maximization affects the USDA’s approach to consumer food safety).

1764

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1729 (2022)

Department is so often wedded to its mission to support the
various agricultural industries, that it has often acted against
the best interest of the public to further its industry-specific
goals. As Biber explained, this could be because industry
outcomes and dollar amounts are easier to measure and come
with higher incentive, or because this has so long been the
practice that institutional memory knows no other way.199
There are numerous examples of USDA mandates
conflicting. For example, in the case of milk, the Department has
employed its marketing and regulatory programmatic arms to
partner with fast food companies to increase consumption of
subsidized commodities (including dairy, corn, wheat, meat, and
soy),200 while simultaneously recommending that Americans
avoid high-fat dairy products because of their harmful effects.201
The USDA also purchases excess dairy (often high-fat dairy)
from farmers and sells it directly to consumers.202 To sell the
surplus resulting from the 2008 Farm Bill,203 the Department
199. See Biber, supra note 169, at 9, 41.
200. See Andrea Freeman, Behavioral Economics and Food Policy: The
Limits and Politics of Nudging, in NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND BEHAVIORAL 124,
130–31 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., Johns Hopkins University Press (2016))
(explaining various commodity subsidies and how they contribute to large
surpluses which need to be sold); see also Deena Shanker, Milking It: How the
US Government Helped McDonald’s Climb Out of Its Sales Rut, QUARTZ (Oct.
29, 2015), https://perma.cc/8P56-ANQ2; Kiera Butler, How the US Government
Helps McDonald’s Sell Junk Food, MOTHER JONES (June 23, 2014),
https://perma.cc/NA6V-PCFK; Scott Fields, The Fat of the Land: Do
Agricultural Subsidies Foster Poor Health?, 112 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. A820,
A821–22 (2004).
201. See USDA & HHS, DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS, 2010, at 2
(7th ed. 2010) (documenting the USDA’s nutritional recommendations for
American consumers). Many of these actions can be explained by the
Department’s adherence to principles of corporate neoliberalism. See, e.g.,
Andrea Freeman, The Unbearable Whiteness of Milk: Food Oppression and the
USDA, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1251, 1263 (2013) [hereinafter Freeman,
Unbearable Whiteness of Milk] (explaining that the USDA functions much like
a private corporation in its attempts to maximize profits or minimize losses for
the dairy industry).
202. See Freeman, Unbearable Whiteness of Milk, supra note 201, at 1266
(discussing the USDA’s decision under the 2008 Farm Bill to purchase excess
supplies of milk and sell them directly to consumers). Notably, Americans
drink less than a third of the milk produced by American dairy farmers. Id.
203. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–246, 122
Stat. 1651.
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relied on the “Got Milk?” campaign, an extremely successful
advertising campaign that has spanned over twenty years.204
The USDA must frequently employ these tactics because of
its earlier decisions. For example, the government has
historically subsidized corn farmers.205 The corn farmers, then,
have lower costs and can thus harvest and produce more corn.206
The wide availability of corn combined with the lower costs
results in lower prices,207 resulting in consumers purchasing
more corn.208 Because corn (along with dairy, soy, and wheat)
receives so much support from the USDA, it is ubiquitous in
American life.209 It is widely available in grocery stores,
restaurants, federal food programs, etc. in a variety of forms
(including high-fructose corn syrup).210 Ultimately, the
subsidy-created surplus incentivizes both the producers and the
USDA (wearing its support hat) to increase sales to consumers.
In the case of corn, most subsidies go to large scale
agricultural operations,211 where the production methods result
in corn that is unfit for direct human consumption.212 Those
204. See Freeman, Unbearable Whiteness of Milk, supra note 201, at
126667.
205. Jennifer Mosquera, Corn, Cows, and Cash: How Farming Subsidies
Work and What They Could Potentially Achieve, 34 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L.
191, 194–95 (2018).
206. See Jonathan Foley, It’s Time to Rethink America’s Corn System, SCI.
AM. (Mar. 5, 2013), https://perma.cc/7CXH-UCFA (analyzing the production
effects of government subsidies on harvest yields and corn prices).
207. Anthony Kammer, Cornography: Perverse Incentives and the United
States Corn Subsidy, 8 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 27–28 (2012).
208. See id. at 29–30 (explaining how consumers purchased more
heavily-subsidized commodities, like corn, because of increased agricultural
subsidies).
209. See id. at 32 (“[S]ubsidies have reduced the real cost consumers pay
for a range of [unhealthy foods], while healthier foods such as unprocessed
fruits and vegetables have seen significant real price increases.”).
210. See Mosquera, supra note 205, at 198 (“Most of the corn produced for
consumption in the United States is processed into the high-fructose corn
syrup found in many processed foods.”).
211. LUSK, supra note 176, at 26. Farms that sell less than $50,000 worth
of products tend not to receive any USDA farm subsidy funds. Id. at 25. In
contrast, 3.9 percent of American farms sell $1 million or more in products,
and most of these farms receive payments averaging $40,559. Id. at 26.
Payment amount increases with the size of or output from the farm. Id.
212. See Field Corn vs. Food Corn, NEB. CORN BD. (2021),
https://perma.cc/9GY8-JBQ8 (distinguishing “field corn,” which “must go
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farmers must therefore sell their corn to other industries,
namely sweetened beverage manufacturers.213 The sweetened
beverage manufacturers use the corn to create high-fructose
corn syrup, which is used to sweeten soft, energy, and sports
drinks.214 Because the sweetened beverage manufacturers are
now dependent on the corn growers, the USDA has a high stake
in the sale of these beverages, and this has driven much of the
government’s policy on these drinks.
These deceptive practices are the result of two dueling
mandates. In her research on the USDA’s relationship with the
dairy industry, Professor Andrea Freeman argues that the
Department’s mandate to “expand[] markets for agricultural
products” directly contradicts its mandate to “improv[e]
nutrition and health by providing . . . nutrition education and
promotion.”215 Because the Department cannot both expand the
market for dairy and improve overall health (given the science
on dairy consumption),216 it tends to favor industry at the
expense of consumers.217 Ultimately, Professor Freeman finds
that this behavior disproportionately harms socially vulnerable
consumers and attributes it to institutional design.218 She
argues, in part, that the USDA’s multi-role status forces the
Department to decide how to prioritize its goals and to resolve
direct conflicts.219
As it relates to meat, we see this problem primarily within
one particular agency. Of the USDA’s eighteen primary
agencies,220 the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) is most
through a mill and be converted to food products and ingredients like corn
syrup” before humans can consume it, from other corn varieties that humans
can consume without processing, like sweet corn and popcorn).
213. Kathryn Doyle, Foods from Subsidized Commodities Tied to Obesity,
REUTERS (July 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/KD4L-DK9Q.
214. Id.
215. Freeman, Unbearable Whiteness of Milk, supra note 201, at 1263
(second alteration in original).
216. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
217. Id. at 1263–64.
218. Id. at 1264.
219. Id.
220. These include: (1) Agricultural Marketing Service; (2) Agricultural
Research Service; (3) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; (4)
Economic Research Service; (5) Farm Service Agency; (6) Food and Nutrition
Service; (7) Food Safety and Inspection Service; (8) Foreign Agricultural

WHAT’S THE BEEF?

1767

directly tasked with promoting competition. AMS’s mission is to
“administer[] programs that create domestic and international
marketing opportunities for U.S. producers of food, fiber, and
specialty crops.”221 Notably, the agency is also tasked with
“provid[ing] the agriculture industry with valuable services to
ensure the quality and availability of wholesome food for
consumers across the country.”222 This is the precise dichotomy
that produces the aforementioned conflict. Moreover, AMS’s
Livestock and Poultry Program, formerly known as the Grain
Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA)
(and absorbed by AMS in 2017), has always taken a very active
role in promoting and ensuring the livelihoods of farmers,
ranchers, and producers.223
GIPSA was a very active agency. Not only did it concern
itself in the economic state and business practices of the
livestock and poultry industries, but it also engaged in
rulemaking, investigation, and enforcement activities.224 Under
the Obama administration, the agency drafted new rules
seeking to regulate competition and held hearings related to
accusations of imperfect competition in the meat sector
(Congress ultimately stopped this effort).225 The agency also
conducted its own studies, initiated its own investigations, and

Service; (9) Forest Service; (10) FPAC Business Center; (11) National
Agricultural Statistics Service; (12) National Institute of Food and
Agriculture; (13) Natural Resources Conservation Service; (14) Risk
Management Agency; (15) Rural Development; (16) Rural Utilities Service;
(17) Rural Housing Service; and (18) Rural Business-Cooperative Service. See
Agencies, USDA, https://perma.cc/CG82-47E9.
221. About AMS, USDA, https://perma.cc/MQ9G-MUX7.
222. Id.
223. See id. (explaining that in 2017 Secretary Perdue realigned offices in
the USDA to help the Department “better meet the needs of farmers, ranchers,
and producers, while providing improved customer service and maximize
efficiency”).
224. See USDA, GIPSA, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2016–2020 15 (2016),
https://perma.cc/6YUF-LUDU (PDF).
225. See JOEL L. GREENE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41673, USDA’S “GIPSA
RULE” ON LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY MARKETING PRACTICES 3–5 (2016)
(documenting the regulations GIPSA drafted during the Obama
Administration in response to consolidation of various agricultural sectors).
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monitored outcomes.226 In 2013, for example, GIPSA charged
$106,387 in fines for violations of the Packers and Stockyards
Act and won almost $3 million in litigation (primarily through
rulings issued by an administrative law judge).227 This all
accords with Department efforts to promote the economic
viability of the industry.
Not long before GIPSA was absorbed by AMS, its Packers
and Stockyard Division (PSD) had begun to include plant-based
and lab-created proteins in its list of industry concerns.228
According to the agency’s 2019 Annual Report:
Consumer interest in non-meat-based proteins has
accelerated in recent years. In response, investment has
increased in plant-based proteins and biotechnological
innovations such as cultured meat. While Beyond Meat and
Impossible Foods are at the forefront offering alternatives to
animal-based burgers, sausage, and chicken, several
competitors have also developed their own brands of
plant-based proteins, including Tyson Foods, Conagra,
Nestle, and Kellogg.
Several animal industry trade groups are continuing to
educate consumers and policymakers about differences
between animal-based meat and alternative-meat products.
These trade groups are also seeking protections from the
Federal Government and State Governments in the
marketing and labeling of plant-based and lab-created
protein items to ensure they are not labeled as meat, beef, or
burgers, for example.229

This blatant, pro-industry bias further demonstrates why the
USDA should not regulate cell-cultured meat.
One problem with the USDA’s conflicting mandates,
specifically as they relate to meat, is that a large body of
evidence suggests that the Department, when forced to choose,
will always side with industry. The PSD, a formerly powerful
arm of the USDA, was explicitly tasked with protecting
226. See USDA, PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS PROGRAM 2013 ANNUAL REPORT
23 (2014), https://perma.cc/68J5-G65D (PDF) (documenting the various
programs the Program initiated in support of its enforcement responsibilities).
227. Id. at 8.
228. USDA, PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT 2019 1
(2020), https://perma.cc/E36Y-R36K (PDF).
229. Id.
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competitive markets for livestock, meat, and poultry.230
Moreover, the PSD had already identified lab-created proteins
as an industry concern, and based on the language of its report,
tacitly, if not openly, approved of attempts at protectionism
being advanced by “several” animal industry trade groups.231
There is no reason to suspect that these same principles and
priorities were lost in the agency realignment. Further, given
that the Department has already sided with industry in the
cases of dairy and corn, there is no reason to expect a different
outcome in the case of cell-cultured meat.
If we know that the Department has multiple mandates,
which might often conflict and generally go against the greater
good of the public, then it logically follows that the Department’s
involvement in the regulation of cell-cultured meat is
inappropriate. Here, the Department is tasked with
“improv[ing] health in the United States” on one side and with
maximizing profits and minimizing losses for the beef and cattle
industry on the other. These two goals cannot peacefully coexist.
4.

Agency Capture

The mixed mandate problem has either created or
exacerbated a capture problem whereby the animal agriculture
industry exercises an outsized influence on the USDA.232 Since
its inception, the USDA has maintained a relatively cozy
relationship with the beef and cattle industry.233 The interests
230. See id. at 25 (analyzing the PSD’s Competition Branch and the
anti-competitive behavior it was responsible for preventing).
231. See id. at 22 (“Several industry trade groups are continuing to educate
consumers and policymakers about differences between animal-based meat
and alternative-meat products.”).
232. Regulatory capture occurs whenever a federal agency prioritizes the
interest of a specialized interest group over the public. See Scott Hempling,
“Regulatory Capture”: Sources and Solutions, 1 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE &
ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 23, 24–25 (2014). The problem is that the rent-seeking,
relatively small interest group can leverage its resources to command some or
all of the benefits of a program that would otherwise be a public good. Id.
Significantly, the costs are almost always borne by the taxpayers. Id. at 28.
233. Michael Taylor, the head of the Food Safety and Inspection Service
(FSIS) under President Clinton, has stated, “It is just a political context, a
culture that has developed over the years at the political level, the food safety
program at the USDA thinking of the industry as the customer rather than
the consumer, and thinking in terms of efficient inspection rather than
protecting public health.” Steve Johnson, The Politics of Meat, PBS:
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of the USDA and livestock lobby are so intertwined that the
agency is incapable of promulgating regulations motivated
solely by public interests.234 This phenomenon is known as
capture, and it completely dictates the agency’s strategy.235 This
means that the USDA, as the long arm of the livestock industry,
acts more like a lobbyist than like a public agency.236 Further,
once a regulator is “captured,” industry representatives
(lobbyists) seek to ensure that all new rules and regulations
benefit the regulated parties.237 Here, in the case of cell-cultured
meat, the USDA must then prioritize the interests of the beef
and cattle lobby over those of the general public.
While the USDA might have initially regulated in the
public interest, Professor John Shepard Wiley, Jr. argues that it
is difficult for an agency to remain independent, and that its
regulations simply become “a method of subsidizing private
interests at the expense of public good.”238 Moreover,
[o]nce capture becomes an entrenched feature of agency
culture, it can be difficult to uproot. . . . Efforts by Congress
or the Executive Branch to eliminate capture are unlikely to
pay political dividends and will probably antagonize

FRONTLINE, https://perma.cc/CTQ5-DM46. Taylor realized just how cozy the
relationship between the USDA and the beef industry was upon entering his
new office and discovering that of the two numbers programmed for speed dial
on his telephone, one was for the American Meat Institute and the other was
for the National Cattlemen’s Association. Id.
234. See Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The USDA’s Struggle to Pass Food
Safety Regulations, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 142, 143 (1997) (“Often, it is only
where there is a public outcry over industry practices that agencies step in to
protect public interests . . . .”).
235. Id. at 142.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism,
99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723 (1986). It is important to note that the USDA is not
the only captured agency. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
for example, refused to investigate Bernie Madoff for ten years even though it
had been repeatedly warned that Madoff’s financial statements did not make
sense. See Dick Carozza, SEC Watchdog Monitors Agency’s Progress After
Madoff Case, FRAUD MAG. (May 2010), https://perma.cc/NE8H-P74T. The
SEC’s inaction led to the loss of billions of dollars for investors. Id. Madoff was
an influential member of the investment community and thus the SEC never
satisfactorily supervised or audited him. Id.
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powerful interest groups. Complacency seems the better
course—for everyone but the public at large.239

There is vast literature on the USDA’s captured regulator
status as the beef and poultry industries captured the agency
long ago.240 Professor Marion Nestle writes that “meat and
poultry producers . . . generously support both political parties,
form close personal relationships with members of Congress and
officials of regulatory agencies, and often use the so-called
revolving door to exchange their executives’ positions for those
in government and vice versa.”241 The result of this relationship
is “decades of industry and government indifference, dithering,
and outright obstructionism.”242 Naturally, it has followed that
the USDA will protect the interest of the beef industry over the
interests of the public.
Over time, the USDA—which is tasked with protecting the
nation’s interest—has come to identify itself with agribusiness
generally, as well as the beef (the largest agribusiness industry)
and poultry industries specifically.243 This was possible, in part,
because agribusiness has managed to keep a bevy of powerful
allies in the upper levels of the USDA.244 Previous Secretary of
Agriculture, Sonny Perdue, for example, had deep ties to

239. Nicholas Bagley, Response, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO
1, 1 (2010).
240. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 234, at 147–56 (describing the USDA’s
inability to pass food safety regulations in the face of food-borne illnesses);
Bruce Friedrich, When the Regulators Refuse to Regulate: Pervasive USDA
Underenforcement of the Humane Slaughter Act, 104 GEO. L.J. 197, 202 (2015)
(explaining that FSIS refuses to adequately administer the Humane Methods
of Slaughter Act (part of FMIA)); MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: THE POLITICS OF
FOOD SAFETY 27–33 (2010) [hereinafter SAFE FOOD] (observing the resistance
of the “major food industries” to agency oversight and regulation); MARION
NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND
HEALTH 96–111 (2013) (describing the growth of “hundreds—if not
thousands—of businesses, associations, and individuals attempting to
influence federal decisions” about food); DAVID ROBINSON SIMON,
MEATONOMICS: HOW THE RIGGED ECONOMICS OF MEAT AND DAIRY MAKE YOU
CONSUME TOO MUCH—AND HOW TO EAT BETTER, LIVE LONGER, AND SPEND
SMARTER 62–69 (2013) (describing USDA marketing efforts).
241. SAFE FOOD, supra note 240, at 62.
242. Id. at 27.
243. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
244. Id.
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agribusiness.245 Perdue had started or otherwise been linked to
more than a dozen agribusiness companies and limited liability
corporations, and he had served on the board of the Georgia
Agribusiness Council before he was appointed.246 Further,
Perdue had an extensive industry-friendly record evidenced by
his years as Georgia’s governor.247 This record combined with
other views—such as denying climate change—endear him to
some of the largest groups that lobby the USDA.248 Perdue’s
appointment was viewed as a gift to the agribusiness industry
writ large.249
During his term, Secretary Perdue surrounded himself with
other agribusiness leaders. His Chief of Staff, Heidi Green, for
example, was formerly a partner in Perdue’s shipping
business.250 The Deputy Secretary, Stephen Censky, came from
a twenty-one-year stint as Chief Executive Officer of the
American Soybean Association (which represents an industry
worth tens-of-billions of dollars annually).251 Ted McKinney, the
former Undersecretary of Agriculture for Trade and Foreign
Agricultural Affairs, spent his career in some of the world’s
largest multinational agribusiness companies, including Dow
AgroSciences, DowElanco, and Elanco.252 The list goes on.253

245. See Colin O’Neil, EWG Investigates: Trump’s Agriculture Nominee
Brings the Swamp to Washington, ENV’T WORKING GRP. (Mar. 8, 2017),
https://perma.cc/L52D-N2CQ (detailing Perdue’s connections to agribusiness).
246. Id.
247. See Ricardo J. Salvador & Nora Gilbert, Sonny Perdue Vows to Make
American Agriculture Great Again—But for Whom?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2017,
9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/SP34-LZUV (describing Perdue’s record as
governor of Georgia).
248. See id. (describing the positive industry reaction to Perdue’s
nomination as a “telling signal of what to expect”).
249. See id. (sharing The National Chicken Council’s, The National
Cattlemen’s Beef Association’s, and The American Farm Bureau Federation’s
uniform praise of Perdue’s appointment).
250. See Ian Kullgren, How Perdue’s Power Benefits His Friends, POLITICO
(Mar. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/8APC-2MXP.
251. See Erica Shaffer, USDA Deputy Secretary to Rejoin Soybean Group,
MEAT + POULTRY (Sept. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/X8R6-PWHF.
252. See Elanco Exec Becomes Ag Director, INSIDE IND. BUS. (Aug. 18,
2015), https://perma.cc/B3RN-MNKX (describing McKinney’s employment
history).
253. For example, Rebeckah Adcock, a senior advisor in the Secretary’s
office who previously worked as a lobbyist for the Kentucky Farm Bureau, the
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More important, however, are the policy decisions that these
individuals helped to make.
A regulated industry is incentivized to lobby Congress and
the politicians who oversee the specific agency—such as
congressional committee and subcommittee members. The
committees are important because they control an agency’s
legislative mandate and funding.254 Thus, when an industry is
unable to persuade the agency to see things its way, the industry
can then focus its lobbyists on the congressional members
serving on the committees that oversee the agency.255 The beef
and poultry industries are especially adept at this. It can be said
that the meat industry has captured Congress. A report from
the Center for Public Integrity, titled Safety Last: The Politics of
E. Coli and Other Food-Borne Killers, evaluated congressional
responses to food safety issues from the Reagan administration
to the Clinton administration.256 According to the report, meat
interests have not only filled the campaign coffers of lawmakers,
but also plied those lawmakers with all-expense paid trips and
“dangl[ed] the possibility of lucrative post-employment
opportunities.”257 In doing so, “the meat interests have
overwhelmed the supposedly objective decision-making process
in Washington.”258 In the context of food safety, for example,
“attempts to give federal agencies the right to enforce food safety
American Farm Bureau Federation, and CropLife America, all agribusiness
groups. See Sara Wyant & Spencer Chase, Meet Sec. Perdue’s New Inner Circle
at USDA, AGRI-PULSE (May 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/272M-Z2KZ. Adcock
has been accused of misusing her connections and positions during her time in
office. She met with former CropLife colleagues to discuss pesticide impacts on
water quality, an issue she was prohibited from working on at USDA because
of her previous lobbying activities and despite having signed an ethics
agreement prohibiting such contacts. See Danielle Ivory & Robert Faturechi,
U.S.D.A. Official’s Emails with Lobbyists Are Sought After Hearing, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/YB6E-R4EF.
254. See Mark Sidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence
on Agency Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1994) (describing
Congress’s ability to overrule agency policies and affect agency appropriations
as “an important check on agency decision-making”).
255. See Friedrich, supra note 240, at 208.
256. CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, SAFETY LAST: THE POLITICS OF E. COLI AND
OTHER FOOD-BORNE KILLERS 1 (1998) [hereinafter SAFETY LAST],
https://perma.cc/QZ4X-TFEE.
257. Id. at 3.
258. Id.
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regulations have been blocked repeatedly by food producers and
their supporters in Congress.”259
The success of the meat lobby is due to its size and the size
of its coffers. Combined, the meat and poultry industries make
up the largest segment of U.S. agriculture.260 Further, the
country is the world’s largest producer of beef and the world’s
fourth largest beef exporter (after Brazil, India, and
Australia).261 The country’s beef production for 2019 was
forecast at a record 12.7 million tons, an increase of 4 percent
from 2018.262 Beef exports for 2019 were forecast at a record 1.5
million tons, almost 12 percent of production, and up 3 percent
from 2018.263 Further, the growing global demand for beef is
expected to provide opportunities for American exporters to
increase their market share in the coming years.264 The beef and
poultry industries combined generate about $1.02 trillion in
total economic output or 5.6 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP).265 The two industries combined are also responsible for
approximately 5.4 million jobs and $257 billion in wages.266
Given the importance of beef to the American economy,
American agribusiness, and the American way of life,267 it
should come as no surprise that the American beef industry is
one of the country’s wealthiest and best-organized constituent
groups.268 Beef industry lobbyists spend millions of dollars each
year to block legislation that would increase industry regulation

259. SAFE FOOD, supra note 240, at 29.
260. Id. at 19.
261. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., USDA, LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY: WORLD
MARKETS AND TRADE 4, 5 (2018), https://perma.cc/85JB-T3AE (PDF).
262. Id. at 3.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. The United States Meat Industry at a Glance, N. AM. MEAT INST.,
https://perma.cc/VK8V-XBDY.
266. Id.
267. See generally ROGER HOROWITZ, PUTTING MEAT ON THE AMERICAN
TABLE (2006).
268. Most of the companies involved in the meat industry are represented
by one or more of the powerful meat and trade organizations including the
American Meat Institute, the National Meat Association, and the National
Cattlemen’s Beef Association. See Johnson, supra note 233.
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and thus reduce production or the bottom line,269 and to ensure
the election of politicians who favor the industry.270 The overall
consequence is that some legislators cater to the interests of the
beef and cattle industry and, in doing so, further tie the hands
of the USDA.
Ultimately, the regulatory scheme, as proposed jointly by
the FDA and the USDA, will be rife with inherent bias. Imagine,
if you will, what labels the USDA might create for cell-cultured
meat with the beef and cattle lobby as its guide. We can certainly
expect labels that seek to clearly distinguish cell-cultured meat
from traditional meat in an effort to dissuade consumers from
the former.271 These labels will ostensibly serve to protect the
health and safety of consumers (disguised protectionism), but
there is a strong possibility that they will also turn off potential
buyers.272 Terms have been bandied about such as “Franken”
meat, “faux” meat, “fake” meat, and the like.273 This would have
a profound impact on the success of cell-cultured meat.274

269. See SAFETY LAST, supra note 256, at 76 (listing the top recipients in
the Senate and House of Representatives of campaign contributions from the
meat industry). For a listing of contributions made to federal candidates by
political action committees within the livestock industry, broken down by
election cycle, see Livestock PAC Contributions to Candidates, OPENSECRETS,
https://perma.cc/PHA6-9RP3.
270. See Kerri E. Machado, Comment, Unfit for Human Consumption:
Why American Beef Is Making Us Sick, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 801, 826–29
(2003) (naming several Republican political appointees with extensive ties to
the beef industry who instigated various beef industry-friendly policies).
Interestingly, unlike the approach used by most big businesses, the meat
industry targets a small number of key lawmakers and regulators—only the
ones most likely to impact their business interests. See Johnson, supra note
233.
271. See Jenny Splitter, The Name Game: Cultured Meat Could Suffer the
Same Fate as GMOs, New Research Suggests, FORBES (July 11, 2019),
https://perma.cc/MU4J-EDM8 (“[L]egislation aimed at preventing companies
from using the term ‘meat’ for anything other than conventionally raised meat
has now been proposed or has already been passed in a number of
jurisdictions.”).
272. See id. (stating that technical descriptions of cell-cultured meat
“seem[] to be a turn-off” for consumers).
273. See infra Part IV.B.
274. See Splitter, supra note 271 (noting “the vast body of research on
media coverage and public perception of genetically modified foods” that “could
serve as a cautionary tale for cultured meat advocates”).
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Consumers are extremely sensitive to food labels.275 Our
regulators should thus be mindful of promoting fairness and
developing a schema based only on the science. Whether or not
cell-cultured meat is truly an environmental blessing, its
adoption should not be thwarted by an agency with such a long,
sordid history of capture. Instead, consistent with a liberal
market economy, our food policy should both combat disguised
protectionism and support the consumer-citizen’s quest for
unbiased information.
B. The Origins of the USDA’s Jurisdiction and Its Expertise
The USDA’s relationship with meat, which we largely take
for granted in modern times, did not always exist. It was not
until Upton Sinclair published The Jungle in 1905 that meat
health and safety were brought to the attention of the American
public.276 The book vividly described the unsanitary working
conditions in a Chicago meatpacking plant that consumers
began to fear that any meat consumption would lead to
disease.277 Consequently, in 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt
signed the FMIA “for the purpose of preventing the use in
interstate or foreign commerce . . . of meat and meat food
products which are unsound, unhealthful, unwholesome, or
otherwise unfit for human food.”278
The Act gives the Secretary of Agriculture, at their
discretion, the authority to appoint inspectors to examine “all
cattle, sheep, swine, and goats before they shall be allowed to
enter into any slaughtering, packing, meat-canning, rendering,
or similar establishment, in which they are to be slaughtered
and the meat and meat food products thereof are to be used in
275. See id. (describing research on consumer responses to different
presentations of cell-cultured meat).
276. See Machado, supra note 270, at 802 (describing the federal
government’s response to the “public fears” and “mass hysteria” resulting from
The Jungle’s publication).
277. Id.
278. Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) of 1906, 59 Pub. L. 382, 34 Stat.
674 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–695). Prior to the enactment of
the FMIA, there had been many reported incidents of “meat scandals”
concerning health violations and unsanitary practices within the American
Meat Industry. See A.R. Miller, The Federal Meat Inspection Act, 11 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 565, 566 (1956).
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interstate or foreign commerce.”279 The FMIA also specifies that
no meat or meat food products “shall be sold or offered for sale
by a person, firm, or corporation in interstate or foreign
commerce under any false or deceptive name,” but “established
trade name or names which are usual to such products and
which are not false and deceptive and which shall be approved
by the Secretary of Agriculture are permitted.”280 In sum, the
legislation’s original purposes were to prohibit the sale of
adulterated or misbranded livestock and derived products as
food, to ensure that livestock were slaughtered and processed
under sanitary conditions at meat processing plants, and to
ensure that all meat was labeled accordingly.281
The USDA’s focus on proper sanitation of slaughtering,
packing, meat-canning, and factory operations makes sense in
context. These spaces, especially in the early 1900s, were rife
with opportunity for contamination.282 In Sinclair’s time, factory
conditions were abysmal. Animal carcasses were often left in the
open, rotting, with blood draining freely (along with fat, dirt,
grime, and guts) into grates in the factory floor.283 This tainted
meat would later be sold to the public.284 Likewise, the mandate
prohibiting adulteration was especially necessary.285 The work
in these factories was so dangerous that factory workers often
lost body parts, which would mingle with and become ground
into the meat.286 This accidental contamination existed
separately from some of the intentional adulteration and

279. Federal Meat Inspection Act, 34 Stat. at 674.
280. Id. at 676.
281. See Miller, supra note 278, at 566–67. Primary responsibility for the
regulation of manufacturers and labeling falls to the USDA’s Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS). See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
282. See Roger Roots, A Muckraker’s Aftermath: The Jungle of
Meat-Packing Regulation After a Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2413, 2417
(2001) (describing the “vile and despicable” conditions of meat plants in the
early 1900s).
283. See UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE 113 (1906) (describing how the
carcasses of “tubercular” cattle were “left upon an open platform and carted
away to be sold in the city”).
284. Id.
285. See id. at 405 (noting the prevalence of adulterated goods in the early
1900s).
286. See id. at 117 (describing incidents of workers falling into vats and
“go[ing] out into the world as Durham’s Pure Leaf Lard”).
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deceptive practices that existed during this time.287 The first
well-known instance of mass meat adulteration, for example,
came about in 1898 when Armour & Co., a Chicago meatpacking
company, supposedly supplied U.S. servicemen in Cuba with
spoiled canned beef during the Spanish-American War.288 Many
believed that rather than dispose of the bad beef, Armour
packed the tins with a layer of boric acid to mask its stench.289
Legend has it that when the troops consumed the meat, many
of them fell ill and died.290
The majority of the USDA’s rules and regulations around
meat are meant to proscribe this type of behavior. The FMIA
requires the inspection of meat before, during, and after
slaughter, and during all processing steps.291 It also requires
approval of labels for all processed meat products and sanitation
monitoring of all facilities and equipment used in packing
plants.292 To implement these mandates, the USDA places its
own FSIS inspectors in the country’s many meat and poultry
slaughterhouses and processing plants.293 These government
inspectors are continuously present in all meat manufacturing
plants.294 Inspectors are tasked with identifying potential points
of food safety risk and developing methods to mitigate those
risks using the principles of Hazard Analysis and Critical
287. See id. at 160 (detailing the “miracles of chemistry” used to disguise
spoiled meat).
288. See Edward F. Keuchel, Chemicals and Meat: The Embalmed Beef
Scandal of the Spanish-American War, 48 BULL. HIST. MED. 249, 263 (1974)
(describing “[c]ases of spoiled canned beef” that were “stamped ‘inspected and
passed’”).
289. Id. at 253.
290. Id. at 249 (explaining the public perception that “‘embalmed beef’ was
responsible for much of the sickness and death of the [Spanish-American]
war”).
291. Federal Meat Inspection Act, 34 Stat. at 674.
292. Id. at 676.
293. See USDA, 2021 USDA BUDGET EXPLANATORY NOTES—FOOD SAFETY
AND INSPECTION SERVICE 24-11 (2021), https://perma.cc/A5FL-EHC6 (PDF).
The USDA also determines the eligibility of other countries to export meat,
poultry, and egg products into the United States, and inspects 100 percent of
those imported products. Id.
294. See id. at 24-12 (“FSIS has a statutory mandate for carcass by carcass
slaughter inspection, a once-per-shift per day presence for processing
inspection of meat and poultry, and continuous inspection of processed egg
products plants.”).
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Control Points (HACCP).295 The inspectors are required to
perform sanitation checks along with pathogen and residue
testing multiple times a day.296
Cell-cultured meat does not fit squarely into this system. As
previously established, the product is the result of a
cell-culturing process that does not begin with an animal
carcass. While a few cows may be involved at the beginning of
the process, they will not be slaughtered, and thus there is no
need to inspect them before they enter a slaughterhouse.
Moreover, the animal biopsies will take place in an
FDA-regulated laboratory.297 The distinction here is critical.
Labs are much more sanitary than slaughterhouses.298 And
while the risk of contamination will never fully dissipate, these
labs are already, under the terms of the FDA-USDA agreement,
responsible for ensuring that the cell lines are free of
contamination and are unadulterated.299 Because of the
manufacturing processes inherent in cell-cultured meat, the
greatest risks of contamination are in the lab.300 Further, the
most likely sources of contamination will be unlike those with
which the USDA has the greatest amount of experience,
including the diseases contracted from other animals and
nearby digestive organs as previously discussed.301 As such, the
USDA’s expertise, honed over more than a century and
extremely important elsewhere in the areas of health and
human safety, is unnecessary in this space.
295. See id. at 24-2 (“HACCP requirements include meeting sanitation,
facility, operational standards, and other prerequisite programs to control
pathogen contamination and to produce safe and unadulterated food.”).
296.
See USDA, FSIS GUIDANCE FOR A SUGGESTED REPORTING TABLE FOR
THE CERTIFIED ESTABLISHMENT LIST 2, https://perma.cc/7VVW-FSQD (PDF)
(“The requirement for government inspection once per production shift during
processing operations is not the same as inspection once daily; therefore, if an
establishment has more than one production shift per day . . . a government
inspector must be present at least once during each production shift.”).
297. See Chriki & Hocquette, supra note 26, at 3 (“Advocates of in vitro
meat claim that it is safer than conventional meat, based on the fact that
lab-grown meat is produced in an environment fully controlled by researchers
or producers . . . .”).
298. Id.
299. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
300. See Chriki & Hocquette, supra note 26, at 3 (describing cell-cultured
meat’s potential safety issues).
301. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
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C. The Federal Meat Inspection Act

Putting aside the USDA’s mandate and the expertise it may
or may not bring to the regulation of cell-cultured meat, the
USDA’s involvement in such regulation may still be proscribed
under the terms of the FMIA. The USDA defines “meat” as “[t]he
part of the muscle of any cattle, sheep, swine, or goats which is
skeletal,” including any fat, bone, skin, sinew, nerve, and blood
vessels “which normally accompany the muscle tissue.”302 While
the FMIA does not set out a specific definition of meat, it does
define “meat food product” as “[a]ny product capable of use as
human food which is made wholly or in part from any meat or
other portion of the carcass of any cattle, sheep, swine, or
goats . . . .”303 Cell-cultured meat only requires the extraction of
cells (mostly stem) from a living animal.304 This does not align
with the definition of meat product provided under the FMIA,
which implies (if not dictates) that the meat product must
originate with a carcass.305 In the cell-cultured meat production
process, there is no carcass, thus rendering cell-cultured meat
outside the scope of the FMIA’s definition.
The FMIA definition of meat food product also excludes
from USDA coverage any food product that “contain[s] meat or
other portions of such carcasses only in a relatively small
proportion or historically have not been considered by
consumers as products of the meat food industry . . . .”306 The
test used to determine whether the USDA is responsible for
products containing a small portion of meat is referred to as
“amenability.”307 Products that are not amenable are not subject
to USDA rules and regulations, including FSIS inspection.308
The determination turns on how a product is formulated, rather
than the composition of the finished product.309 Any
302. 9 C.F.R. § 301.2 (2021).
303. 21 U.S.C. § 601(j).
304. See Rubio et al., supra note 25.
305. 21 U.S.C. § 601(j).
306. Id.
307. See FOOD STANDARDS AND LABELING POLICY BOOK, supra note 162, at
6 (defining “amenability” for the purpose of the USDA).
308. Id.
309. See id. (stating that amenability is determined based on the
proportion of “livestock ingredients” used to produce the product).
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meat-containing product that is more than 3 percent raw meat,
2 percent cooked meat, or 30 percent fat or tallow falls under
USDA jurisdiction; anything less falls under FDA
jurisdiction.310 Here, at the point of formulation, the only thing
present is stem cells.311 Even if one were to look beyond the stem
cell, to the culture, there is no raw meat or cooked meat to speak
of. The culture certainly does not contain 30 percent fat or
tallow. As such, meat is not technically a significant portion of
the product.
Finally, the definition provides that excluded products must
comply with any requirements that are imposed in such cases or
regulations as conditions of such exemptions “to assure that the
meat or other portions of such carcasses contained in such
products are not adulterated and that such products are not
represented as meat food products.”312 Again, the primary
concerns are those of adulteration and misbranding.313 Here,
cell-cultured meat should be subject to the rules and regulations
of the FDA, which will be responsible for ensuring that the
products are not adulterated and not labeled as meat food
products (which is extremely unlikely even with the USDA
involvement).
Despite the clear intent of the FMIA, the USDA seems to
have premised its participation in the oversight of cell-cultured
meat on the fact that, at the end of cell-culturing process, there
is a product that is best described as meat. Yet, cell-cultured
meat is not meat because of the tissue engineering involved in
its production and the fact that it is not actually any edible part
of an animal. The end product is not meat, but rather a
near-perfect meat substitute. Moreover, if the USDA’s
involvement in the regulation of cell-cultured meat is contingent
upon a finding that cell-cultured meat is in fact meat, that raises
a serious problem for horizontal coherence elsewhere in the
government.

310. Id. Examples of meat products that would fall under FDA jurisdiction
include things like spaghetti sauces, pork and beans, pretzel dogs, and gravy
mixes. See id.
311. See Post, supra note 32, at 1339–40.
312. 21 U.S.C. § 601(j).
313. See id. §§ 601–626.
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D. Horizontal Coherence

Courts should read statutes in light of larger statutory and
constitutional policy. This practice serves to maintain a
coherent system of governance.314 When courts draw inferences
from both the common law and the regulatory and policy
landscapes, they can ensure that old statutes comport with the
current legal landscape.315 Moreover, this approach ensures that
public values bring a statute into the political and legal
equilibrium.316 A number of legal, regulatory, and policy venues
have already considered the labeling of cell-cultured meat. In
each of those venues, the conclusion has been that cell-cultured
meat is not really meat.317 This further shows that the USDA’s
guidance here is unnecessary.
Recently, states have begun defining meat through “real
meat” laws, as they are colloquially known.318 In 2018, Missouri
became the first state to regulate use of the term meat on
labels.319 The Missouri law forbids “misrepresenting a product
as meat that is not derived from harvested production livestock
or poultry.”320 The law defines meat as “any edible portion of
livestock, poultry, or captive cervid carcass or part thereof,” and
314. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND
INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES 566 (2014) (discussing coherence canons for interpreting statutes,
like the Reenactment Rule and Legislative Acquiescence Canon).
315. See, for example, Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983), in which Chief Justice Burger relied on public policy (including the
Constitution, Title VI and other provisions of the Civil Rights Act, other
statutes, judicial precedents, executive actions, and regulations) to conclude
that the political equilibrium at the time justified the Court’s response.
316. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 314, at 568–69.
317. See, e.g., 1 JAMES T. O’REILLY & KATHARINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 10.10 (4th ed. 2021) (describing the FDA and USDA’s
combined regulatory approach to cell-cultured meat); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 47-17-510 (2021) (prohibiting the advertisement of cell-cultured meat as
“meat” or “clean meat”).
318. For an excellent discussion on how animal law can help promote the
rights of alternative-meat companies and help plant-based and cell-based
products reach more consumers, thus reducing consumer demand “for
products that require the violent deaths of billions of animals a year,” see
Jareb A. Gleckel & Sherry F. Colb, The Meaning of Meat, 26 ANIMAL L. 75
(2020).
319. See S. 627 & 925, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018).
320. MO. ANN. STAT. § 265.494(7) (2021).

WHAT’S THE BEEF?

1783

“meat product” as “anything containing meat intended for or
capable of use for human consumption, which is derived, in
whole or in part, from livestock, poultry, or captive cervids.”321
As such, cell-cultured meat cannot be labeled as “meat” in
Missouri. Similar laws have been passed elsewhere, including
in Alabama,322 Kentucky,323 Montana,324 North Dakota,325 and
South Carolina,326 where the laws focus specifically on the
labeling of cell-cultured meat. Interestingly, the North Dakota
law goes one step further, forbidding the packaging of
cell-cultured meat in a manner that is the same or “deceptively
similar” to a conventional meat product.327 A number of other
states have passed laws regulating the labeling of cell-cultured
meat
and
plant-based
meat
alternatives—including
Arkansas,328 Mississippi,329 South Dakota,330 and Wyoming.331 It
is safe to assume that, given the steady clip at which states have
adopted this approach, there will be many more in the future.332
A federal bill has also recently entered the calculus. In
October 2019, the Real Marketing Edible Artificials Truthfully
Act (Real MEAT Act) was introduced in the House by a
Republican from Kansas and a Democrat from New York.333 If
successful, the bill would prevent cell-cultured meat from using
the word “beef” for labeling purposes. The bill would define
“beef” as “any product containing edible meat tissue harvested
321. Id. § 265.300(7)(8).
322. H.R. 518, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2019).
323. H.R. 311, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2019).
324. H.R. 327, 66th Leg., Sess. (Mont. 2019).
325. H.R. 1400, 66th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019).
326. H.R. 4245, 2019 Gen. Assemb., 123d Sess. (S.C. 2019).
327. H.R. 1400, 66th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 23 (N.D. 2019).
328. H.R. 1407, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2019).
329. S. 2922, 136th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2019).
330. S. 68, 94th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2019).
331. S. 68, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2019).
332. At the time of submission, at least fourteen states had enacted meat
labeling bills, but more than twenty-five bills on the topic have been
introduced in state legislatures. See Jessica Almy, States Attempt to
Criminalize Using “Meat” on Cell-Based Meat Labels, GOOD FOOD INST. (Mar.
12, 2019), https://perma.cc/3LUS-3L49 (“Lawmakers in over a dozen states are
pushing for laws that would criminalize labeling cell-based meat with the word
‘meat.’”).
333. H.R. 4881, 116th Cong. (2019).
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in whole form from domesticated Bos indicus or Bos taurus
cattle.”334 The bill also requires “any imitation meat food
product, beef, or beef product” to “be deemed to be misbranded
unless its label bears, in type of uniform size and prominence,
the word ‘imitation’ immediately before or after the name of the
food and a statement that clearly indicates the product is not
derived from or does not contain meat.”335 Similar policies are
underway internationally.336
If law and policy have already found that it is in the public
interest to distinguish cell-cultured meat from conventional
meat, then it stands to reason that the USDA should abdicate
its oversight authority. As it stands, the livestock industry is
most pleased with the proposed joint regulatory framework.337
Its ultimate goal is to restrict market entry. The more barriers
to entry that can be imposed, the larger share of the
meat-consuming market the livestock industry is able to
retain.338 By splitting regulatory oversight between the USDA
and the FDA, and by giving the USDA regulatory authority over
labeling, the beef and cattle industry has the best of both worlds.
Producers of cell-cultured meat will have to endure the frequent
USDA inspections, to which incumbent beef producers are also
subject, and cellular agriculturists will have to undergo
pre-market label approval (likely with labels that will otherize
their products)339 as is also required of traditional beef
334. Id.
335. Id. Interestingly, the bill also gives the FDA thirty days from
discovery to initiate enforcement measures. Id. If the agency fails to do so
within that window, the USDA then has permission to enforce at will. Id. If
the FDA is monitoring labeling violations, then the FDA should also be
responsible for labeling decisions.
336. See France to Ban Use of Meat Terms to Describe Vegetable-Based
Products, BBC NEWS (Apr. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/9CSF-B998 (“Food
producers will no longer be able to use ‘steak’, ‘sausage’ or any other meat term
to describe products that are not partly or wholly made up of meat.”).
337. See Industry Groups Praise USDA, FDA Cell-Based Protein
Agreement, But Are Still Opposed to Calling it Meat or Beef, FENCE POST (Mar.
7, 2019), https://perma.cc/HZQ6-P25W.
338. Recognizing that there are many competing definitions to the term
“barrier to entry,” the author uses Franklin Fisher’s definition, “anything that
prevents entry when entry is socially beneficial.” Franklin M. Fisher,
Diagnosing Monopoly, 19 Q. REV. ECON. & BUS. 7, 23 (1979).
339. With USDA regulation, meat industry stakeholders may have a say
in the labeling of cultured meat and can thus distinguish it from their own
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producers.340 But cell-cultured meat producers will also be
responsible for reporting to the FDA, which is not required of
traditional beef producers.
The benefits to the livestock industry cannot be overstated.
Bifurcated oversight will restrict competition. The irony is that
on the one hand these individuals and organizations argue that
cell-cultured meat is not meat and should not be labeled as such,
but on the other hand it is sufficiently meat-like to be subject to
the meat regulations promulgated by the FMIA.341 This can only
be explained by the USDA’s capture at the hands of the livestock
industry. All of this is completely inappropriate, given the
USDA’s mixed mandate problem, related capture, the USDA’s
expertise, the terms of the FMIA, and the distinctions already
established in the broader law and policy arena.
IV. ADEQUACY OF FDA CONTROL
When thinking about the regulation of cell-cultured meat,
it is important to look at each step of the process in conjunction
with each agency’s tasks. To start, the USDA must oversee
establishments where cells are harvested from livestock or

products; they will clearly depict the meat as “lab-grown,” “cell-cultured,” etc.,
and may position it as “fake” or “faux” meat, or another denigrating title
depicting cultured meat as inferior to traditionally sourced meat. See Erica
Shaffer, U.S.D.A., F.D.A. to Jointly Oversee Cultured Meat Regulation, FOOD
BUS. NEWS (Nov. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/3HUK-DPA6 (“Meat industry
stakeholders have supported U.S.D.A. playing a leading role in regulating
‘fake meat.’”).
340. See supra notes 293–296 and accompanying text.
341. Oliver Roberts, one of my Research Assistants, helpfully pointed out
that this irony actually cuts both ways. Producers of cell-cultured meat want
the benefits that inure from a strong association with conventional meat, but
they do not want the USDA regulations. Certainly, they should not be able to
have it both ways either. The broader issue is that under the current scheme,
cell-cultured meat producers are disadvantaged because they (1) do not get the
benefits associated with having a simple meat label, but (2) are also subject to
heavy-handed USDA regulations. If the product is not meat and should not be
labeled as such, then the appropriate response is to allow for FDA regulations
in totality. If the product is meat, then it should be labeled as such, and
cell-cultured producers should be subject to rigorous USDA regulations. Under
no circumstances should cell-cultured producers be subject to the
disadvantages of both systems.
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poultry.342 Yet livestock farming is already heavily regulated by
the USDA.343 There are laws related to animal health and
safety, their feed, hormone usage, etc.344 All these regulations
will carry over to cell-cultured meat because there is no
difference between the livestock used for biopsy and the
livestock used for conventional meat. The USDA also has
preexisting regulations for the appropriate use of anesthesia on
animals.345 These USDA regulations already exist and none of
them are specific to cell-cultured meat. The next stage of the
manufacturing process is the in-vitro growing process, which
will require FDA regulations and careful review to ensure
product safety, quality, and consistency.346 There is nothing that
the USDA can do to help manage this part of the process. The
final stage of the manufacturing process will include processing,
production, packaging, labeling, cold storage, and handling at
points of sale.347 Here, the FDA-USDA requirement authorizes
the USDA to inspect establishments where the products are
processed, packaged, or labeled in accordance with the FSIS
regulations.348 In doing so, the USDA will ensure that the
products are safe, unadulterated, and properly labeled.349
Proper labeling will require USDA preapproval in addition to
verification through inspection.350 Yet the FDA is more than
capable of inspecting these establishments and their products,
and of handling labeling responsibilities.

342. See Formal Agreement Between FDA and USDA, supra note 20; see
also 7 C.F.R. § 205.239 (2021) (“The producer of an organic livestock operation
must establish and maintain year-round livestock living conditions which
accommodate the health and natural behavior of animals. . . .”).
343. See Health and Safety, USDA, https://perma.cc/8FAC-SGAA
(“USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) ensures that our nation’s
meat, poultry and processed egg supply is wholesome, safe and properly
labeled.”).
344. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 603(a) (“[T]he Secretary shall cause to be
made . . . an examination and inspection of all amenable species before they
shall be allowed to enter into any slaughtering, packing, meat-canning,
rendering, or similar establishment . . . .”).
345. See Analgesia and Anesthesia, USDA, https://perma.cc/22DD-S7KP.
346. See Formal Agreement Between FDA and USDA, supra note 20.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
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A. Regulation of Establishments
The FDA and the USDA share351 a focus on the prohibition
of adulteration and misbranding.352 This requires the agency to
regulate the safety of any ingredients used in the production of
food products, including meat and poultry products.353 To
accomplish this mission, the FDA routinely inspects any
establishment that manufactures, processes, packs, or holds
food (except for those establishments that are regulated
exclusively by the USDA).354 These inspections are completed
periodically (every few years), except in the case of high-risk
351. When the agencies share overlapping responsibilities for food
products, they develop memoranda of understanding (MOU) to facilitate their
interactions. See, e.g., FDA, MOU 225-99-2001, MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION (2018), https://perma.cc/XH5H-C5PC (FDA and FSIS joint
jurisdiction); FDA, MOU 225-14-0009, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (2017),
https://perma.cc/U94R-NHDR (catfish inspection).
352. The FMIA’s misbranding provisions state that food products are
“misbranded” if their “labeling is false or misleading in any particular.” 21
U.S.C. § 601(n)(1). According to § 342 of the FDCA, a food is adulterated
whenever it “contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may
render it injurious to health”; “consists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid,
or decomposed substance,” or is “otherwise unfit for food”; or “has been
prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby” it may be
rendered injurious to health. Id. § 342(a)(1).
353. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(1)(A)
The Secretary shall—by order establish a regulation (whether or
not in accord with that proposed by the petitioner) prescribing, with
respect to one or more proposed uses of the food additive involved,
the conditions under which such additive may be safely used
(including, but not limited to, specifications as to the particular food
or classes of food in or in which such additive may be used, the
maximum quantity which may be used or permitted to remain in or
on such food, the manner in which such additive may be added to
or used in or on such food, and any directions or other labeling or
packaging requirements for such additive deemed necessary by him
to assure the safety of such use) . . . .
354. See, e.g., Egg Safety Inspections, FDA (Apr. 12, 2018),
https://perma.cc/3G9C-ZGZE (discussing FDA inspections of egg production
facilities). In addition to inspecting those locations where food is held in
interstate commerce, the FDA also inspects any vehicle used for food
conveyance, including boats, trains, and airplanes. See Interstate Travel
Program, FDA (Nov. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/LG8G-LY2J.
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food facilities, with the help of state officials who are contracted
to assist with many field inspections.355 The outcome of these
inspections depends on good manufacturing practices, a hazard
analysis, and the presence of risk-based preventive controls
designed to prevent any food safety problems.356
The FDA will use the Current Good Manufacturing Practice
and Hazard Analysis and Risk-Based Preventive Controls for
Human Food as the foundation for its inspections.357 These
rules, in conjunction with “a thorough pre-market consultation
[and registration] process,” are sufficient to safely oversee
“products derived from cultured animal cells.”358 This is a very
thorough approach. First, the FDA hazard analysis identifies
every known or reasonably expected biological, chemical, and
physical hazard.359 If any hazards are found, the establishment
must institute preventative controls (including process, food
allergen, sanitation controls, etc.).360 The preventative control
protocols must be in writing, ensuring that no food is
adulterated as a result of the various hazards that have been
identified, and outlining facility plans to oversee and monitor
the controls that have been put in place.361 Further, the rules
require each manufacturer to have a risk-based supply chain
program in place for any product associated with a known
hazard that requires preventative control.362 Whenever a hazard
is identified in a food product, the plan must have a procedure
in place to notify stakeholders and the public and to issue
recalls.363 Moreover, the FDA has the benefit of the Food Safety
355. See David Saxowsky, Regulation of the U.S. Food Processing Sector,
N.D. ST. UNIV., https://perma.cc/6XM7-NKXV (“The FDA and a state agency in
each state . . . are both authorized to inspect any food processing firm in the
state. These inspections can occur at any time the business is operating and
do not have to be announced before the arrival of the inspector.”).
356. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 117 (2021).
357. See id. (creating and defining the standards).
358. Food Made with Cultured Animal Cells, FDA (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://perma.cc/27WU-MWUJ.
359. See 21 C.F.R. § 117.130(b) (2021) (describing examples of biological,
chemical, and physical hazards that must be identified if known or reasonably
foreseen).
360. Id. § 117.135.
361. Id.
362. Id. §§ 117.405, 117.410.
363. Id. § 117.139.
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Modernization Act (FSMA),364 which gave the FDA mandatory
recall authority and increased the frequencies of inspections at
high-risk food facilities.365
Unlike the FDA’s inspections, which seek to determine
compliance, the USDA takes a stricter, constant-presence
approach. These inspections take place on a periodic basis.366 In
contrast, the FSIS inspects establishments with a focus on
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP).367 This
means that the FSIS agents will identify potential problem
areas that risk food safety and help the organization develop
methods to mitigate those risks.368 The FSIS inspectors are in
every federally inspected meat processing plant during every
shift.369 While there, they conduct their HACCP and sanitation
checks, test for pathogens and residue, and perform other food
safety activities.370
Under the joint agreement, the FDA rules will govern the
production process and produced biological material, including
tissue collection, cell lines, and cell banks, along with
manufacturing controls, and all components and inputs.371 In
contrast, the USDA rules will govern cell-cultured meat
processors, producers, and packagers.372 This distinction seems
arbitrary. One might argue that the USDA’s constant-presence
approach is more appropriate than the FDA’s periodic approach.
However, every FDA-regulated establishment understands that
either the FDA or the state can appear at any time to inspect or
to take samples of the product test.373 As a result, these
establishments must run a tight ship, constantly maintaining
cleanliness and proper operating practices, as is the case with

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011).
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 2221–2225.
9 C.F.R. § 417.4 (2021).
Id. § 417.2.
Id. §§ 417.4, 417.8.
2021 USDA BUDGET EXPLANATORY NOTES—FOOD SAFETY AND
INSPECTION SERVICE, supra note 293, at 24-12.
370. 9 C.F.R. § 417.8 (2021).
371. Formal Agreement Between FDA and USDA, supra note 20.
372. Id.
373. See Saxowsky, supra note 355 (“[I]nspections can occur at any time
the business is operating and do not have to be announced . . . .”).
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Further,
if
an
USDA-inspected
establishments.374
establishment refuses an inspection, it will be subject to serious
enforcement actions (as is also the case under the USDA).375
More importantly, this process is sufficient to oversee
processors, producers, and packagers of almost every other
processed food (and drugs and biologics—which have more in
common with cell-cultured meat than with conventional meat).
B. Labeling
Both the FSIS and the FDA are responsible for ensuring
that food products contain labels that are truthful and not
misleading.376 Yet the USDA has been tasked with labeling
preapproval.377 FSIS’s authority to mandate preapproval comes
from a provision of the FMIA, which states that no food article
“shall be sold or offered for sale by any person . . . in commerce,
under any name or other marking or labeling . . . [except]
established trade names and other marking and labeling and
containers which are not false or misleading and which are
approved by the Secretary.”378 Thus, products that have been
preapproved must bear the USDA mark of inspection before
they can be offered for sale.379
FSIS requires prior approval for all labels used on its meat
and poultry products before they can be marketed in interstate
commerce.380 As such, it is extremely likely that FSIS will
374. See id. (“Because an inspection can be conducted at any time, the firm
must continuously be ready for an inspection. Cleanliness and proper
operating practices must be maintained at all times, for example.”).
375. See id. (“[T]he FDA or state agency can ask to view any part of the
processing facility, to inspect the business’ records, and take samples of the
business’ product for testing . . . [and] [a]ny plant that refuses to allow an
inspection to allow an inspection will be subject to enforcement action . . . .”).
376. See Formal Agreement Between FDA and USDA, supra note 20.
377. Id.
378. 21 U.S.C. § 607(d).
379. See 7 C.F.R. § 52.53 (2021) (discussing the requirements for a USDA
inspection mark and the different Grades of the inspection marks).
380. FSIS evaluates upward of 60,000 labels each year when they are sent
to the agency for evaluation and approval. USDA, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL FOOD
LABELING REQUIREMENTS FOR MEAT, POULTRY, AND EGG PRODUCTS 7 (R. Post et
al. eds., 2007), https://perma.cc/KT2G-6LL7 (PDF). However, not all labels
need to be submitted to the Labeling Program and Delivery Staff (the unit
within FSIS responsible for labeling oversight); FSIS has created specific
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require that cell-cultured meat product producers undergo label
approval before bringing their products to market. It is not clear
how the USDA will regulate these labels under current
guidance, but it is likely that any cell-cultured meat label
containing words related to cell-culturing or meat will require
special statements review prior to entering commerce.381
Here, again, the agencies have vastly different approaches.
The FDA also regulates all aspects of labeling under its
jurisdiction.382 However, the FDA does not require prior label
approval for every food product it oversees. Instead, it monitors
compliance
through
various
forms
of
post-market
surveillance.383 In practice, this means that the FDA chooses to
review only a small portion of its food labels, but label reviews
are often done at the request of a manufacturer.384 They also can
arise from a trade complaint by a competitor,385 from a consumer
inquiry,386 or as the result of an on-site inspection of a
manufacturing facility.387

regulations for generically approved labels which are the labels that do not
need to be submitted. 9 C.F.R. § 412.2 (2021). Generically approved labels are
labels that bear all applicable mandatory labeling features in accordance with
the Federal regulations. Id. Examples of these features are product name, safe
handling statement, packer or distributor, net weight, legend, and nutritional
labeling. Id.
381. See USDA, FSIS COMPLIANCE GUIDELINE FOR LABEL APPROVAL 20
(2020) (explaining that labels with special statements and claims must be
evaluated by FSIS).
382. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 341–350
(governs food products under the FDA’s jurisdiction); Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1461 (sets packaging and labeling
requirements for consumer goods).
383. See FDA, A FOOD LABELING GUIDE: GUIDANCE FOR THE INDUSTRY 31
(2013) (“FDA does not have the resources to analyze products upon request.
However, FDA will collect surveillance samples to monitor the accuracy of
nutrition information.”).
384. See id. at 48 (“Firms in need of special allowances should make their
request [to the FDA] in writing . . . .”).
385. See How to Report Product Problems and Complaints to the FDA, FDA
(Oct. 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/GW43-SAZV (describing the process for filing
a complaint about any product the FDA regulates).
386. See FDA Food and Cosmetic Information Center Answers Your
Questions, FDA (Mar. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/EL9L-49SA (explaining the
FDA’s Food and Cosmetic Information Center’s consumer inquiry process).
387. See Inspection Classification Database, FDA (Sept. 16, 2021),
https://perma.cc/273L-23YA (“The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
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The FDA has the benefit of 21 C.F.R. § 130.8 to inform its
approach to labeling. These regulations develop standards of
identity for special food,388 which is arguably the real issue at
hand. “Milk,” “chocolate,” and “bread,” for example, mean
something very specific to the average consumer. These
regulations ensure that the products that are labeled as such
conform with those ideas.389 Here, the only real question is
whether cell-cultured meat can be described as “meat.” As is the
case with milk, chocolate, and bread, the FDA can issue a
blanket ruling and then be done.390 There is no need for the
USDA’s strict oversight of every label marking a cell-cultured
product. The standards of identity also require producers to
follow set guidelines about required ingredients, proportions,
and manufacturing processes involved in each specific food.391
Again, that is what is most important here. More important
than, say, whether the USDA inspected the packing facility.
Ultimately, the standard of identity prevents manufacturers
from deceptive marketing (even as it relates to adulteration).
The big issue here is that the livestock industry, and thus
the USDA, wants explicit labels that clearly distinguish meat
from its lab-grown competitor (so that cell-cultured meat does
not become a simple substitute). Proponents of USDA labeling
of cell-cultured meat argued that the term “meat” should be
reserved for products derived from traditional agriculture
methods.392 As noted earlier, cultured meat detractors have

conducts inspections and assessments of regulated facilities to determine a
firm’s compliance with applicable laws and regulations . . . .”).
388. See 21 C.F.R. § 130.8 (“[A] food does not conform to the definition and
standard of identity . . . [i]f it contains an ingredient for which no provision is
made in such definition and standard . . . .”).
389. See John Agar, Generally Recognized as Sour Cream: Treating
Standards of Food Identity as a Success, 44 FOOD, DRUG, COSMETIC L.J. 237,
246 (1989) (explaining that the use of standardized names is reserved for
standardized products).
390. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 131.110 (setting specific requirements for
standardized milk and cream).
391.
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 139.110 (specifying the minimum and maximum
requirements, optional ingredients, and prohibited ingredients for macaroni
products).
392. See Candice Choi, Meat 2.0? Clean Meat? Spat Shows the Power of
Food Wording, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/S6FA99EX (“The U.S. Cattlemen’s Association . . . petitioned the USDA in February
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compiled a long list of names that denigrate cultured meat;
these names include lab-grown meat, synthetic meat, and faux
meat.393 Some jokingly refer to the product as franken meat.394
This marked hostility towards cell-cultured meat is the result of
the livestock industry’s desire to prevent lab-grown proteins
from competing with their products.395 The cellular agriculture
industry, on the other hand, wants to make no such distinction;
they argue that cell-cultured meat is indistinguishable from
slaughtered meat.396 Consumers fall somewhere in the middle;
they would like the labels to show that cell-cultured meat does
not result from traditional animal agriculture methods but are
not committed to the wholesale removal of any reference to
meat.397 How the product is labeled is outside the scope of this
to enforce that ‘beef’ and ‘meat’ only be used for animals ‘born, raised and
harvested in the traditional manner.’”).
393. See id. (“The [National Cattlemen’s Beef Association] prefers less
appetizing terms such as ‘in vitro meat,’ ‘synthetic meat’ or even ‘meat
byproduct’ for meat grown through cultured cells.”).
394. See, e.g., Alan Boyle, It’s (Not) Alive! Franken-Meat Lurches from the
Lab to the Frying Pan, NBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/3TFJ-7SCB.
395. See Choi, supra note 392 (“The spat shows the power of language as a
new industry attempts to reshape eating habits. It’s why the $49.5 billion U.S.
beef, poultry, pork and lamb industry is mobilizing to claim ownership of the
term ‘meat.’”). Currently, the definition of meat, per the USDA’s regulations,
reads,
The part of the muscle of any cattle, sheep, swine, or goats which is
skeletal or which is found in the tongue, diaphragm, heart, or
esophagus, with or without the accompanying and overlying fat,
and the portions of bone (in bone-in product such as T-bone or
porterhouse steak), skin, sinew, nerve, and blood vessels which
normally accompany the muscle tissue and that are not separated
from it in the process of dressing.
9 C.F.R. § 301.2; see also 21 U.S.C. § 601(j) (defining “meat food product” as
“human food which is made wholly or in part from any meat or other portion
of the carcass of any cattle, sheep, swine, or goats . . . .”).
396.
See Choi, supra note 392 (“The Good Food Institute, an advocacy and
lobbying group for meat alternatives, is embracing ‘clean meat,’ which
channels the positive connotations of ‘clean energy’.”).
397. A June 2018 nationally representative Consumer Reports phone
survey found that 52 percent of respondents thought that cell-cultured meat
should be labeled as “meat, but accompanied by an explanation about how it
is produced,” while only 43 percent said cell-cultured meat should be labeled
as “something other than meat.” CONSUMER REPS., FOODS PRODUCED USING
ANIMAL CELL CULTURE TECHNOLOGY 4 (2018), https://perma.cc/DT6R-LKUZ
(PDF). Only 5 percent thought it should be labeled as “meat without any
further explanation.” Id. Further, when given a list of seven terms and asked
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Article. Resolution of the labeling issue is significant for
would-be consumers because labeling will inform their views on
the products and thus determine the overall viability of the
industry. Regulators should make such an important
determination in an unbiased manner.
In sum, the FDA is more than capable of overseeing
establishments, labeling cell-cultured meat, and enforcing its
own rules in regulations. The agency already has policies and
approaches in place that will prove less detrimental for
cell-cultured meat, while also maintaining safety and efficacy.398
In fact, these are the same regulations that will govern
cell-cultured products derived from animal species that are not
subject to USDA jurisdiction, including all seafood (other than
Siluriformes), fish, game meat, and foods intended for animal
consumption.399 This further suggests that existing law and
policy do not require shared jurisdiction in this space.
V.

LEGAL STRATEGIES

The problem, on its face, is simple. When it comes to the
regulation of cell-cultured meat, there are too many hands in
the pot. This problem only exists because early in the
decision-making process the FDA voluntarily abdicated some of
its oversight authority. There are many reasons why an agency
might choose to engage in this redelegation of power. It is
possible that the FDA believed that by collaborating with the
USDA, each agency would be able to capitalize on the other’s
expertise and experience, and thus improve decision-making.
But that does not appear to be the case here. Recall that in early
2018, both agencies issued statements claiming oversight
authority for cell-cultured meat.400 The more likely scenario is
that shared jurisdiction came about as the result of some sort of
political maneuvering or bartering. Whether or not that really
is the case matters very little for purposes of this Article. More
to choose which would constitute accurate labeling, the most chosen terms
were “lab-grown meat” (35 percent) and “artificial or synthetic meat” (34
percent). Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
398. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 130.8, 131.110, 139.110 (providing examples of
the FDA’s ability to set specific standards of identity for cell-cultured meat).
399. See GAO-05-213, supra note 157, at 2.
400. See GREENE & ANGADJIVAND, supra note 17, at 1–2.
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important are the broader questions it raises: is shared
jurisdiction necessary here or is shared jurisdiction appropriate
here? The answer is clearly no. The logical follow-up question
then becomes—where do we go from here?
When Singapore became the first country to approve the
sale of cell-cultured meat in December 2020, it did so via a “novel
food” petition.401 The Singapore Food Agency reviewed the
petition under the safety standards that it has developed
especially for novel foods.402 Today, those standards have
provisions specific to cultured meat.403 They require that
manufacturers of cultured meat produce a description of the
overall manufacturing practice, a characterization of the
cultured meat product (including nutritional composition);
information related to the cell lines used (including the identity
and source of the cell lines, a description of the methods used to
select and screen for cells, information on how they are prepared
and banked following their extraction from animals, etc.);
information related to the culture media; information on the
scaffolding material (when applicable); information on how the
purity and genetic stability of cell culture is ensured during the
manufacturing process; a safety assessment regarding possible
hazards arising from the manufacturing process; and any other
studies to support safety (including digestibility assays, allergen
profiling, genetic sequencing, etc.).404 In the European Union,
cell-cultured meat will be governed by an existing regulation on
novel food products.405 This regulation also requires producers
to file an application (with the European Food Safety Authority)
and addresses many of the same manufacturing concerns.406

401.
See David J. Ettinger et al., Cultured Meat: Shaping the Future of
Foods, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/D27R-WAXR.
402.
Id.
403. See SING. FOOD AGENCY, REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SAFETY ASSESSMENT
OF
NOVEL FOODS AND NOVEL FOOD INGREDIENTS 1314 (2021),
https://perma.cc/6AH7-U8B2.
404. Id.
405. See generally Council Regulation 2015/2283, 2015 O.J. (L 327) (EU)
[hereinafter EU Regulation].
406.
See id. at 4 (“In order to ensure the harmonised scientific assessment
of novel foods, such assessments should be carried out by the European Food
Safety Authority . . . .”).
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China also appears to be trying to bring cell-cultured meat to
market, using a petition process for “new food ingredients.”407
For the foregoing reasons, the United States should
dispense with its shared jurisdiction gambit in favor of a process
much like those utilized by other countries. With very few
modifications, the FDA’s Generally Recognized as Safe
(GRAS)408 process can be used to approve and oversee the
manufacture of cell-cultured meat. The biggest difference
between GRAS in the United States and Novel Foods in the
European Union is that the European Union requires
pre-market approval for the regulation of novel food products.409
The United States GRAS process currently does not. Instead, a
U.S. food manufacturer can convene an independent panel of
experts to determine whether the potential food product is
generally recognized as safe.410 The panel’s decision is based on
findings in peer-reviewed scientific journals.411 Once the panel
has determined that a product is GRAS, the manufacturer can
choose whether to consult the FDA.412 If the FDA is not
consulted, the process results in a self-affirmed GRAS status.413
If the FDA is consulted and responds with a “no further
407. See Ettinger et al., supra note 401.
408. See 21 C.F.R. § 170.30 (establishing eligibility for classification as
“generally recognized as safe,” which exempts a food from pre-market approval
if it has been generally recognized among qualified experts as safe under the
conditions of its intended use).
409. See EU Regulation, supra note 405, at 4 (“Novel foods should not be
placed on the market or used in food for human consumption unless they are
included in a [European] Union list of novel foods authorised to be placed on
the market within the Union . . . .”).
410. See FDA, BEST PRACTICES FOR CONVENING A GRAS PANEL: DRAFT
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 4 (2017), https://perma.cc/9SQR-2XXP (PDF).
411. Id. at 2526.
412. See FDA, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR SUBSTANCES INTENDED FOR
USE IN HUMAN FOOD OR ANIMAL FOOD ON THE BASIS OF THE GENERALLY
RECOGNIZED AS SAFE (GRAS) PROVISION OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND
COSMETIC ACT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 5 (2017) (“A substance that is GRAS
for a particular use may be marketed for that use without [FDA] review or
approval.”).
413. See Sanford Bigelow, The Ability to Self-Affirm the Safety of Novel
Food and Dietary Supplement Ingredients and Market Them on Your Own
Recognizance, EXPERTS (Apr. 10, 2012), https://perma.cc/34ZM-5Z3Z
(explaining that GRAS self-affirmation occurs when a “company determines
for themselves that the conditions of use of the novel ingredient in food . . . is
generally recognized as safe, or GRAS”).
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questions” letter, the product is FDA certified GRAS.414 The key
distinction between the European and American processes turns
on whether there is existing data and published studies.
There are not many published studies on mass-produced
cell-cultured meat in existence. With sole oversight authority,
however, the FDA could eliminate both the self-affirmed GRAS
process and the “no further questions” letter and require cellular
agriculture manufacturers to undergo an abbreviated
pre-market approval process that acknowledges cellular
agriculture to be generally recognized as safe. The benefits here
are threefold. First, by undergoing the more demanding process
that we see in the rest of the world, cell-cultured meat will be
safer. There will be no blanket regulations. Each manufacturer
will be individually responsible for proving to the FDA that their
processes are sanitary, and their products are safe for
consumption. There will be no quick workarounds or shortcuts
to undermine the efficacy of the process. This process would also
allow manufacturers to bring their products to market much
more quickly. Those that already have systems and facilities in
place will no longer have to wait for the creation of new
regulations or the establishment of new processes by which they
might bring their products to market. Instead, they will be able
to apply for recognition immediately and begin to sell once they
are approved. Finally, this is a process that the FDA can easily
implement as it is similar to approaches it has taken in both the
food and drug spaces for decades.415 The only real disadvantage
of this approach is that such comprehensive review is resource
intensive.416 This seems like a small concern, however, given the
monumental costs associated with cell-culturing today.417 Very
414. See About the GRAS Notification Program, FDA (Oct. 2016),
https://perma.cc/9CYD-AGEV.
415. See History of the GRAS List and SCOGS Review, FDA (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://perma.cc/4FGM-74FL (“The FDA first published a list of these
generally recognized as safe (GRAS) substances in the Federal Register of
December 9, 1958.”).
416. See Great to Be GRAS, NUTRITION INDUS. EXEC. (2011),
https://perma.cc/QX87-ANLJ (“The estimated cost for GRAS affirmation is
$75,000 and the time frame was approximately two years to complete . . . .”).
417. See Joe Fassler, Lab-Grown Meat Is Supposed to Be Inevitable. The
Science Tells a Different Story, COUNTER (Sept. 22, 2021, 1:19 PM),
https://perma.cc/7BUN-AQ2Q (stating that the projected cost of a cultured
meat facility is $450 million).
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few companies are (or likely, will be) involved in this space.418
Those that are can internalize the costs.
The best and easiest way to back out of the current
regulatory morass would be for Congress to grant the FDA
complete control over the regulation of all foods produced via
cellular agriculture. Because Congress has thus far failed to
take a stance on the issue,419 this outcome seems unlikely. In the
alternative, the USDA could cede its authority to the FDA in
recognition of both the agencies’ inherent biases and the
superfluity of its involvement. The fact of the matter is that
cell-cultured meat is produced in facilities that have a lot more
in common with the food manufacturing or biologics facilities
regulated by the FDA than the abattoirs overseen by the
USDA.420 Given the USDA’s vested interest in the sale of
cell-cultured meat, and the fact that it actively sought
involvement in its regulation, this outcome also seems highly
unlikely. Alternatively, the Supreme Court could weigh in on
the issue and determine that the USDA is acting outside the
scope of its mandate, requiring the agency to turn over its
oversight and labeling jurisdiction to the USDA. Finally,
cell-cultured meat manufacturers and product producers could
file an action against the USDA once it has issued its directives
on labeling. The USDA has a long history of being challenged in
court.421 Yet U.S. courts will not overrule the USDA’s decisions
on labeling unless the decision is determined to have been made

418. See LIZ SPECHT, AN ANALYSIS OF CULTURE MEDIUM COSTS AND
PRODUCTION VOLUMES FOR CULTIVATED MEAT 2 (2020), https://perma.cc/7MV8R6S7 (PDF) (stating that by the end of 2018, there were around two dozen
companies, in nine countries, formed to commercialize cultivated meat
technology).
419. See, e.g., Cell-Cultured Meat and Poultry Regulation Act, S. 1056,
116th Cong. (2019) (a bill to clarify oversight and jurisdiction over the
regulation, inspection, and labeling of cell-cultured meat that did not receive
a vote).
420. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
421. See, e.g., Indep. Meat Packers Ass’n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 231 (8th
Cir. 1975) (contesting USDA regulations revising the grading standards for
beef); Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Int. v. Perdue, 438 F. Supp. 3d 546, 553 (D. Md.
2020) (challenging a USDA final rule governing nutrition standards for school
breakfast and lunch programs).
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in bad faith with an abuse of discretion,422 which almost never
happens. Courts usually find that the USDA did not act
arbitrarily or in excess of its authority when promulgating
regulations, but rather acted in good faith.423 Ultimately, the
USDA has virtually untethered discretion in determining what
is false or misleading, so long as it is not arbitrary.
My primary argument here is not that shared jurisdiction
is inherently problematic. The FDA is no stranger to shared
jurisdiction. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
FDA, for example, share authority over the regulation of
pesticides in food.424 The EPA will set tolerable limits for the
FDA to then enforce.425 In times of crisis, such as immediately
following an attack, the USDA and the FDA will collaborate to
make food grade determinations.426 Under this scheme, the
agencies will work together to inspect meat and poultry
products in an attempt to stave off any potential radiation.427
Likewise, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)
and the FDA work together to regulate alcohol;428 the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and the FDA jointly oversee
food, food containers, and food-related articles and
equipment;429 and the FDA helps to oversee the Department of
Veterans Affairs’ (VA) managed contracts for human drugs,

422. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (establishing that a court shall hold agency
action unlawful if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law”).
423. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. USDA, 789 F.3d 1206, 1224 (11th
Cir. 2015) (holding that USDA licensing regulations concerning animal
welfare standards were not arbitrary or capricious).
424. See Pesticides, FDA, https://perma.cc/9G3M-8MWR (last updated
Aug. 31, 2021) (describing the responsibilities of the FDA and EPA concerning
pesticide residue on food and animal feed).
425. Id.
426. See Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication,
128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 847 (2015).
427. Id.
428. See FDA, MOU 225-88-2000, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION AND THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL,
TOBACCO AND FIREARMS (2017), https://perma.cc/NF5U-QCSB.
429. See FDA, MOU 225-76-2003, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION AND THE U.S. FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (2017), https://perma.cc/3R9P-V7EE.
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biologics, and combination products,430 among many other
collaborative efforts. Instead, my argument is that as it relates
to cell-cultured meat, shared jurisdiction is both inappropriate
and unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
When an industry has captured an agency, that agency is
incentivized to insert itself in ever-expanding areas to advocate
that industry’s interest. When the USDA declares that it has an
interest in the regulation of any meat substitute, skepticism and
concern should immediately follow. The FDA has voluntarily
opened the door to potential sabotage at the hands of the USDA.
Recognizing both the USDA’s history of capture and the
unbounded potential of the cellular agriculture industry, it came
as no surprise when, in 2018, the USDA publicly declared its
intention to regulate cell-cultured meat.431 It did come as a
surprise, however, when the FDA agreed to cede some of its
oversight authority to the USDA. It was even more surprising
to learn that the authority the FDA was willing to cede
concerned product labeling. USDA involvement in the
regulation of cell-cultured meat is unnecessary. Even if that
were not the case, given the unique history of and relationship
between the USDA and the livestock industry, this outcome is
highly inappropriate from the perspective of minimizing the
impact of regulatory capture.
Cell-cultured meat has the potential to yield numerous
benefits to society, to the extent that consumers are encouraged
to consume it.432 The production of conventional meat imparts
430. See FDA, MOU 225-19-030, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION (2020), https://perma.cc/S9AJ-AE9H.
431. See GREENE & ANGADJIVAND, supra note 17, at 1.
432. Conventional meat manufacturers are so aware of this that
meatpackers like Tyson Foods Inc. and Cargill, along with numerous other
investors such as Richard Branson and Bill Gates, have invested millions of
dollars to develop cell-cultured meat. Tyson, for example, launched a $150
million venture capital fund (Tyson New Ventures LLC) in December 2016 to
invest in companies “developing breakthrough technologies, business models
and products to sustainably feed a growing world population.” Tyson Foods
Creates Venture Fund to Fuel the Future of Food, TYSON FOODS (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://perma.cc/J3UH-HMSH. Tyson President and CEO Tom Hayes
admitted that the company’s decision to invest in cell-cultured meats and
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negative effects on the environment and human health. If it is
true that cell-cultured meat production will eliminate
environmental contamination from animal waste runoff, remove
antibiotics and artificial hormones from the human diet, and
reduce the likelihood of bacterial contamination, then
consumers of cell-cultured meat would generate diffuse benefits
to society. Moreover, a study from the University of Oxford
estimates that cell-cultured meat could be produced with up to
96 percent lower greenhouse gas emissions, 45 percent less
energy, 99 percent lower land use, and 96 percent lower water
use than conventional meat.433 If cell-cultured meat is truly
capable of feeding the world’s growing population while also
cutting emissions and saving energy and water, why wouldn’t
we want to promote this more efficient and environmentally
friendly way of putting meat on the table? To wit, if cell-cultured
meat is even capable of partially realizing some of these things,
why wouldn’t we want to promote it?
Given the potential benefits of cell-cultured meat and the
risk that the USDA, in its labeling capacity, can easily thwart
its adoption, the USDA should have no role in the oversight of
cell-cultured meat. The FDA should bear sole responsibility for
regulating cell-cultured meat. But as it stands, the agencies
have not considered any of the externalities associated with
their proposed regulatory system. Ultimately, the goal should be
to reduce interest group manipulation and its harmful effects on
consumers, so agencies can return to their proper roles of
advancing the interests of the people. To that end, Congress
must act to ensure that any agency partnerships are both
necessary and appropriate.

plant-based proteins “seemed counterintuitive to some inside our company,”
but that meeting the growing worldwide demand for protein in sustainable
ways “will take a combination of innovative and traditional approaches.” Tom
Hayes, Why We Are Investing in Alternative Proteins, TYSON FOODS (Jan. 29,
2018), https://perma.cc/7Q8C-THGX. In 2018, Upside Foods, a San
Francisco-based cell-cultured meat start-up received $17 million in venture
capital funding from a group of investors that included Cargill, Virgin Group
founder Richard Branson, and Microsoft founder Bill Gates. Paul Sawers,
Lab-grown Food Startup Memphis Meats Raises $17 Million from DFJ,
Cargill, Bill Gates, Others, VENTURE BEAT (Aug. 23, 2017, 6:58 AM),
https://perma.cc/LF7H-EN75.
433. Lab-Grown Meat Would ‘Cut Emissions and Save Energy’, UNIV.
OXFORD (June 21, 2011), https://perma.cc/X5W5-WSCV.

